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ABSTRACT
The coast of Louisiana, with more than three million wetland acres, accounts for about
40 percent of the nation‟s total wetlands. Louisiana is estimated to have lost more than 1.2
million acres of its coastal wetland in the last century. Although 75% of Louisiana‟s coastal
wetlands are privately owned, little has been done to encourage private landowners to
undertake wetland restoration projects. This dissertation examines the factors that influence
the decisions of the landowners to undertake wetland restoration projects. We develop a
theoretical framework for understanding the landowner‟s decision- making process in the
presence of high uncertainty and increasing restoration costs. The condition under which
landowners will invest in wetland restoration and maintenance is derived under the
assumptions of risk aversion and relatively high restoration costs. The validity of the
theoretical model is tested using data from a mail survey of private wetland landowners in
coastal Louisiana that was conducted in Fall of 2009. Two econometric (Tobit and double
hurdle) models are estimated to determine the importance of various factors including risk
aversion on the probability and the level of private coastal wetland investments.
The Likelihood ratio (LR) test shows that the double hurdle model statistically
outperforms the Tobit model. The results suggest that the decision to invest in wetland
restoration and how much to invest appear to be determined by different processes. The
results of the double hurdle model show that risk plays an important role in landowners‟
decisions to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance activities. Landowners who are
risk averse make less investment in wetland restoration and maintenance projects than other
landowners, and landowners who own properties that are located in risk prone areas are less
likely to invest in wetland restoration than other landowners. In addition, the results show that
ix

landowners‟ attitudes toward conservation, income related to the property, participation in
government wetland programs, ownership structure, and wetland property size are all
important determinants of the landowners‟ investment decisions. The analysis emphasizes the
need to incorporate risk into the design of wetland incentive programs to encourage private
landowners to undertake wetland restoration projects in coastal Louisiana.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The coast of Louisiana, with more than three million wetland acres, accounts for about
40 percent of the nation‟s coastal wetlands (Lipton et al., 1995). In the last century, however,
Louisiana is estimated to have lost more than 1.2 million acres (1,875 square miles) of its
coastal wetlands (CWPPRA 2006). A number of factors have contributed to this loss. Topping
the list is the construction of flood-control levees along the Mississippi River (Boesch et al.
1994) which prevent wetlands from receiving adequate fresh water and nutrients that are
necessary to their survival. In addition, the dredging of access canals and navigation channels
led to the redirection of alluvial sediments away from the coast which has exacerbated erosion
and saltwater intrusion. As a result, it is estimated that about 160-200 million metric tons per
year of sediments that once supplied the coastal wetlands are now delivered directly onto the
outer continental shelf (Caffey and Shexnayder 2003; Caffey, 2005). Besides these humaninduced factors, wetland losses are also caused by natural factors such as hurricanes, sea level
rise, land subsidence, and nutria herbivory activities. For example, the U.S. Geological
Survey estimates that 219 square miles of Louisiana coastal wetlands were destroyed as a
result of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita (Barras et al., 2008). According to some estimates, the
economic cost of projected wetland loss from all sources by 2050 under a “no action”
scenario is in the range of $27-$100 billion (LADNR 1999).
In an effort to address the problem of Louisiana‟s coastal land loss, the U.S. Congress
passed the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA) in 1990.
But, given the estimated price tag for coastal restoration of $20 billion (Galloway et al.,
2009), only a fraction of the needed funds have been allocated, with CWPPRA, the largest
program, accounting for only $60 million annually. Several other public restoration projects
1

in the coastal zone of Louisiana have been funded by programs such as the Coastal Impact
Assistance Program (CIAP), the Louisiana Coastal Area (LCA) program, the Coastal Wetland
Reserve Program (CWRP), the Chrismas Tree Projects Program, and the Vegetation Planting
Program initiated under the Louisiana‟s Coastal Wetlands Conservation Plan. CWRP,
introduced to restore coastal wetlands on areas previously converted to agriculture, has
succeeded in restoring hundreds of acres of coastal wetlands (CPRA, 2007). However, the
limited availability of public funding, along with the magnitude of the problem, increases the
importance of finding alternative approaches to addressing the issue of wetland loss in coastal
Louisiana. Given that the vast majority of wetland properties are privately owned, incentivebased mechanisms to encourage private actions may be an appealing alternative approach.

Encouraging landowners to undertake private restoration and maintenance activities
can be a difficult task for several reasons. First, the decision to invest in wetland restoration
and maintenance is subject to a high level of uncertainty associated with future climate
change, changes in restoration technologies, and changes in wetland regulatory policy.
Second, the majority of benefits associated with wetland restoration and maintenance
activities accrue to the public rather than to private landowners. Other reasons that may
prevent private investment include diminishing surface and sub-surface incomes, increasing
regulatory constraints, and a current property tax policy that fails to account for the use value
for the wetland property (Caffey et al., 2003).
1.1 Problem Statement
Louisiana is projected to lose an additional 431,000 acres (673 square miles) of its
coastal wetlands by the year 2050 if the current wetland loss rates continue (CWPPRA 2006).
2

The economic implications of this projected loss are often debated, but there are billions of
dollars that are directly or indirectly derived from activities occurring on these wetlands.
Although 75% of these wetlands are privately owned Caffey et al., 2003), little is known
about how much private investment has been allocated to restoration and maintenance, nor is
there a good understanding of what can be done to encourage private landowners to maintain
and protect their coastal lands. This dissertation seeks to fill this information void by
estimating the amount of private investment (at least for a subset of landowners) and
investigating the factors that influence private Louisiana landowners to invest in coastal
wetland restoration and maintenance activities, with particular emphasis on the influence of
risk aversion and public subsidy programs on the private investment decision. More
specifically, the following questions are addressed in this dissertation: First, what are the
factors that motivate a landowner to undertake wetland restoration and maintenance
activities? Second, what are the factors that deter a landowner from investing in wetland
restoration and maintenance activities? Third, how does uncertainty influence a landowner‟s
decision making process? And finally, how do potential government subsidy programs
influence the landowner‟s investment decision?
1.2. Justification
Given that 75% of the wetland acreage in Louisiana‟s coastal zone is privately owned,
successful coastal wetland restoration efforts will at least partly depend on the decisions of the
private landowners who hold the ownership rights. Little or no effort, however, has been
employed to encourage private wetland landowners to undertake wetland restoration projects
in coastal Louisiana. The majority of wetland restoration projects in the coastal zone are still
addressed through public programs such as the Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and
3

Restoration Act (CWPPRA). These public programs, which generally fail to engage the
landowners in the restoration process lack the monetary resources to adequately address all of
the wetland loss problems in the coastal zone. Even if additional government funding was to
be secured, the cost effectiveness of these public restoration projects by CWPPRA and other
public programs remains an issue of debate. At the same time, several factors have been
proposed as reasons for the lack of private investment by landowners, including increasing
investment risk, diminishing surface and sub-surface incomes, increasing regulatory
constraints, and the public nature of the majority of the benefits of private restoration projects.
Given these problems, there has been a call for the use of incentive based voluntary programs
to encourage the landowners to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance activities.
In this dissertation, I investigate the factors that influence the landowners to undertake
wetland restoration projects in coastal Louisiana. Understanding these factors is important for
the design and implementation of voluntary programs to encourage private investment. For
example, an estimated empirical model of landowner investment decision making can be used
to provide information about the expected probability of participation, the expected level of
investment, and the characteristics of the landowners who are most likely to participate. This
information can provide the policy decision makers with the information needed to design
wetland incentive programs that are both more cost effective and have higher participation
rates than nontargeted wetland incentive programs. In addition, the information provided by
an empirical model may allow policy makers to design incentive programs targeting
restoration projects in areas that are most affected by wetland losses. This information is
important when policy makers have to prioritize among competing wetland restoration
projects given limited funding resources.

4

1.3 Objectives
The overall objective of this dissertation is to investigate the factors that influence
landowners‟ decisions to invest in coastal wetland restoration and maintenance when these
decisions are made in the presence of uncertainty and fixed costs. Specific objectives inc lude:
1. Develop a theoretical model of the landowners‟ decision- making process in the face of
uncertainty and fixed costs;
2. Determine the characteristics of wetland landowners in coastal Louisiana, including
their risk preferences, attitudes toward private restoration and maintenance, the actual
use of their properties, attitudes toward various government incentive programs, and
their general socioeconomic profile;
3. Empirically estimate the importance of risk aversion, public subsidy programs, and
other factors affecting landowner decisions to invest in coastal wetland restoration and
maintenance projects; and
4. Examine the policy implications of the study results and devise policy
recommendations that address the desirability and potential magnitude of private
landowner investment in restoring and maintaining coastal Louisiana wetlands.

The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 examines the
economic and investment literature that relates to restoration-type decision making, including
the potential roles of general factors, risk aversion, and option values. Chapter 3 takes this
literature base and develops a theoretical model of the private wetland restoration decision
making process and draws some tentative implications from the model structure. Chapter 4

5

presents the empirical model. Chapter 5 then presents the design of the survey questionnaire
used to collect data and summarizes the information reported by respondents.. Chapter 6
presents the results of the model estimation, with Chapter 7 summarizing the main findings
and discussing the potential policy implications.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Although there have been a number of studies that have identified factors that are
important to private landowners‟ investment decisions concerning other activities, private
investment in coastal wetland restoration and maintenance has not been seriously studied to
date. A review of these studies is presented in this chapter, beginning with a set of studies that
looked at factors that influence investment decisions under the assumption of risk neutrality.
The second section presents the results of empirical studies concerning the effect of risk
aversion on investment decisions, while the third section examines the results of empirical
studies on the role of option values in investment decisions.
2.1 General Factors Affecting Investment Decisions
Even though there are no studies that specifically examined those factors influencing
decisions to privately invest in wetland restoration and maintenance in coastal Louisiana,
there are a number that have identified general factors that may be important to wetland
conservation efforts in the U.S. and other countries, including the factors influencing
participation in publicly- financed wetland restoration programs. Jones et al. (1995) surveyed
private landowners in New Zealand to determine their attitudes toward wetland protection and
potential conservation mechanisms. The survey results showed that the majority of private
landowners placed importance on the role of wetlands in maintaining water quality and
providing species habitat. With regard to landowner preferences toward various conservation
instruments, the survey revealed that incentive and voluntary instruments were most
preferred. One of the authors‟ conclusion from this result was that conservation programs
7

should use a range of land-use planning mechanisms, including ones based on economic
incentives and financial compensation. Simple correlation tests showed that property size and
the proportion of income derived from the property were significantly related to the
landowners‟ attitudes about the importance and appropriate use of wetland areas. In addition,
landowners who were engaged in farming activities were found to have negative attitudes
toward the protection of wetlands.
Parks and Kramer (1995) investigated farmer participation in wetland restoration
programs in the United States. Results from logit analysis showed that increases in
agricultural benefits decreased the probability of participation in wetland restoration. Farmer
knowledge of government programs and their potential benefits, as measured by government
payments received per acre, were also found to significantly (at the 10% level) increase the
probability of participating. Age and ownership structure were important factors in the
participation decision as well, with older farmers and owner operators being more likely to
become involved in wetland restoration programs. The authors also examined the probability
of participation by county and used this information to calculate the expected acreage restored
and the expected government costs for the restoration.
From an international perspective, Soderqvist (2003) used a random sample of 200
Swedish farmers to determine the factors that influence their willingness to participate in a
catchment-based program for wetland creation in Sweden. The results of a probit analysis
showed that factors such as age, attitudes of farmers, and perceived advantages and
disadvantages of the program were important determinants of participation decisions. The
study concluded that financial factors (i.e., subsidies) were not the sole determinant of a
farmer ‟s willingness to participate in the program, as various private and public
8

environmental benefits of the program were also significantly related to participation
decisions.
Aside from the above studies that focused on wetlands, other studies have examined private
landowner investment decisions concerning other activities. For example, Ervin and Ervin
(1982) examined the factors that determine the use of soil conservation practices using a
random sample of Missouri farmers. The study found that education, perception of the degree
of erosion problem, the susceptibility of soil to erosion, and cost sharing subsidies were
positively correlated with the farmers‟ soil conservation efforts. However, when the number
of soil practices was used as a dependent variable, only education, perception of the degree of
erosion problem, farm type, and risk aversion were statistically significant in their model. The
number of practices used was negatively related to the risk aversion of the farmers, and
positively related to education and the perception of erosion problem. Similarly, Norris and
Batie (1987) used a Tobit model to investigate the soil conservation decisions among Virginia
farmers. Using total conservation expenditures as a dependent variable, the study found that
financial factors - such as income and debt level - are the most important determinants of a
farmer ‟s investment decision. Income had a positive influence on the level of conservation
expenditures, and debt level had a negative influence on the level of conservation
expenditures. Other factors, such as perception of erosion, farm size, education, off- farm
employment, tenure arrangement, tobacco acreage, and the existence of conservation plan
were also important factors in the decision to invest. More specifically, farm size and
education were positively related to the level of conservation investment while tenure
arrangement was negatively related to the level of conservation investment.
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Featherstone and Goodwin (1993) analyzed the factors that influenced Kansas farmers
to invest in long-term conservation improvements. Employing a Tobit analysis, the authors
showed that farm characteristics - such as farm size, debt, erosion level, type of farm, and
participation in government programs - were important explanatory factors. In particular, the
larger the farm size is and the larger the government payments, the higher the likelihood of
participation and the higher the level of investment that would be made. The authors also
found that operator and farm characteristics, such as age and ownership type, had significant
influences on conservation expenditures. More specifically, the older the farm operator is, the
less likely an expenditure would be made and, if made, the smaller the investment that would
be undertaken. At least in Kansas, farms organized as corporations made larger investments
than sole-owner farms. Unlike Norris and Batie (1987), income was not found to significantly
influence overall conservation expenditures. In another study examining the role of
ownership, Soule et al. (2000) used a logit model to estimate the influence of land tenure on
the adoption of conservation practices by U.S. corn producers. The authors extended previous
analyses by distinguishing renters based on lease type and by distinguishing conservation
practices based on the timing of costs and returns. The results of their long-run conservation
tillage model revealed that adoption was significantly and positively associated with farm
size, education, the proportion of the farm in corn and soybeans, and the susceptibility of the
land to erosion, and negatively related to age. Tenure and participation in government
programs were not significant factors in the conservation tillage model. The authors‟ mediumterm practices model showed similar results to the conservation tillage model, with the
exception that the coefficient on tenure was negative and statistically significant. Overall,
study results suggested that cash-renters were less likely to adopt conservation tillage than
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owner-operators, and share renters were less likely than owner-operator to adopt mediumterm practices. In an international context, Layva et al. (2007) analyzed the adoption of soil
conservation practices among 223 olive tree farmers in Spain. Three probit models were
estimated for the three different conservation practices (tillage, terraces with stonewalls, and
non-tillage practices). The study found that farm profitability, age of the farm operator, and
the probability of passing on the farm to a relative were the most important determinants of
the farmer‟s adoption decision.
Similar to the agricultural examples, a number of factors have been identified as
important in forestry management investment decisions. Alig (1986) and Straka et al. (1984)
found a significant positive relationship between household income and forestry investment.
Later, however, Kline et al. (2000) found the relationship between income and forestry
investment to be negative. Romm et al. (1987) used a logit regression to determine the
factors that influence private forestry investment in northern California. The results of the
study confirmed that income, age, and full time residency were the most significant factors in
explaining forestry investment. More specifically, high income and full time residency were
positively related to forestry investment, but absentee ownership, middle-ranged incomes, and
old age were negatively related to the forestry investment. Property size was found to be an
important factor in explaining investment in timber harvesting, but not in general forestry
management. Nagubadi et al. (1996) used a probit model to analyze the participation of
nonindustrial forest landowners in government forestry programs. The study found that
property size, ownership reasons, government sources of information, and membership in
forestry organizations were the most important determinants of program participation. Age,
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risks associated with the loss of property rights, and years of ownership were also important
factors.
In considering the interactions between public and private decision making, Zhang and
Flick (2001) examined the influence of environmental regulations (i.e., Endangered Species
Act) and public financial assistance programs on private reforestation behavior. A two-step
selection model was employed in the analysis. First, a probit model was used to estimate
reforestation decisions. Second, the residuals from this model were retained and a selection
model was estimated for the landowners who had replanted by using the level of investment
as a dependent variable. The results of the probit model showed that the probability of
reforestation investment was positively related to technical assistance and awareness of costshare program, but negatively related to the distance from known endangered species habitats.
None of the demographic variables, such as income or age, were found to be important factors
in the reforestation decisions. The results of the selection model showed that the level of
investment is positively related to the use of reforestation tax incentives and negatively related
to the use of cost-share subsidies. The later implies a substitution effect between public and
private capital. In addition, landowner characteristics such as income, age, and knowledge of
forestry influenced the decisions about the level of reforestation investment. Income and
knowledge of forestry were positively related to the level of investment, but age was
negatively related to the level of investment. Property size was not a significant factor in
either the probit or selection models.
In a more recent study, Dhakal et al. (2008) investigated the factors that influence the
decision of small landowners to invest in forestry plantations in New Zealand. Using a
double hurdle model, the authors found that property size, ownership type, period of
12

landholding, land use in dairy production, experience in grain farming, perception about
forestry tax policy, expectation about future log prices, and percentage of off- farm income
were the most important predictors of the decision to undertake forestry plantation
investments. In addition, the study found that property size, perception about forestry tax
policy, expectation about future log prices, location of the land, and area used in sheep and
beef production were strong determinants in the decision about the extent of forestry
plantation investment. Thus, unlike Zhang and Flick (2001), property size was important in
both the decision to invest and the level of investment undertaken. Property size was
positively related to the probability of investing, but negatively related to the extent of
investment.
2.2 Risk Aversion and Investment Decisions
The majority of the empirical studies summarized in the previous section (with the
exception of Ervin and Ervin 1982) relied on the assumption that all decision makers are risk
neutral even though it is likely that this assumption does not match reality. In the context of
wetland restoration and maintenance, landowners face substantial levels of uncertainty about
how future climatic, economic, and institutional factors will affect the payoffs from their
investments. As a result, it is likely that risk aversion plays an important role in a landowner ‟s
investment decision. The potential impact of risk aversion on investment decisions in the
presence of uncertainty has been empirically explored using a variety of frameworks,
including the expected utility framework (Koundouri et al. 2006; Kim and Chavas 2003;
Antle 1983) and stochastic dominance analysis (Goldstein et al. 2006; Benitez et al. 2006.
This section presents a summary of the main findings of these studies and discusses the
econometric modeling techniques used in the applications.
13

Stordal et al. (2007) applied stochastic efficiency with respect to a function (SERF) to
analyze the impact of risk aversion on the optimal tree replanting decision. Risk aversion was
profoundly influential in determining the certainty equivalence for all rotation strategies
considered. Specifically, the results showed that certainty equivalence was a decreasing
function of the risk aversion of owners. The results also indicated that risk-averse forest
owners chose a higher optimal age of replacement of trees than risk neutral landowners.
Hence, risk aversion influenced both the optimal tree replacement strategy and the
reinvestment decision. The authors concluded that risk aversion needs to be considered when
designing policy measures to influence forestry investments.
Goldstein et al. (2006) used stochastic dominance (SD) analysis to identify specific
Koa forestry business strategies that were associated with risk-efficient land- use options in
Hawaii. The study designed a set of hypothetical business strategies based on income from
timber harvest, two existing government conservation programs, integrated cattle grazing, and
selling carbon offset credits. The results of the analysis were based on cumulative net present
value (NPV) distribution functions of the land- use business strategies generated from Monte
Carlo simulation, and they showed that business strategies in which the landowners receive
rental payment plus cost-share assistance were the most efficient. This implies that programs
like the Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program (CREP) – in which the landowners
received payment and cost share subsidies – could create viable business strategies for riskaverse landowners in Hawaii. Benitez et al. (2006) also used stochastic dominance (SD)
analysis, but in this case to study land allocation problems under risk for shaded coffee
production in the Choco region of West Ecuador. Study results indicated that shaded coffee is
not a risk efficient land use, regardless of the degree of diversification. Hence, conservation
14

payments required for preserving shaded coffee would need to be much higher than
conservation payments calculated under risk neutrality assumptions. These results stressed the
need for considering risk aversion factors when implementing conservation policy
instruments.
In another international context, Hagos and Holden (2006) studied the influence of
risk aversion, land tenure, public programs, and resource poverty on soil conservation
investment decisions in northern Ethiopia. The study measured the risk preferences of
households using hypothetical questions based on a utility function with constant partial risk
aversion. A Probit model was then used to model the factors that influence the decisions to
invest in soil conservation, with a subsequent Tobit model employed to model the factors that
influence the intensity of investment. The authors found that risk aversion played an
important role in a household‟s decision to intensify soil conservation measures but not in the
decision to use soil conservation measures. Risk aversion was negatively correlated with the
level of investment made in soil conservation. In addition, the study revealed that public
conservation programs had a positive influence on private investment. Other factors,
including land characteristics and the perception of returns on conservation investments, were
found to be important in a household‟s decision to invest and intensify soil conservation.
Among the various variables included in of the analyses of technology adoption, risk
has been recognized as a major factor in the adoption decision (Feder, Just, and Zilberman
1985). Saha et al.(1994) developed an empirical and analytical framework for divisible
technology adoption under incomplete information diffusion and output uncertainty. The
analytical framework showed that neither risk aversion of the producers, nor their risk
perceptions, should play a role in the adoption decision. These risk factors, however, should
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play an important role in the degree of adoption if the producers decided to adopt the
technology. Koundouri et al. (2006) extended the theoretical framework of Saha el al. (1994)
to allow risk aversion and uncertainty to influence the technology adoption decision. The
model was empirically tested using survey data of irrigation technology adoption practices by
265 Greece farmers. Using the first four moments of the profit distribution to approximate
production risk in a logit model, the study found that risk influenced the farmer ‟s decision to
adopt the new irrigation technology. Specifically, farmers who faced more production risk
were more likely to adopt new irrigation technology, suggesting that farmers chose to adopt
new technology in order to hedge against production risk. In addition, the study found that
farmers value the prospects of receiving new information to use in their adoption decision
making. In a more recent paper, Torkamani and Shajari (2008) applied a logit model to
investigate factors affecting adoption of new irrigation technologies by wheat farmers in three
major Iranian districts. The study used a moment based approach to estimate the risk premium
associated with water use, which was then used to estimate the risk attitudes of the farmers.
Assuming that the risk preferences of the farmers exhibited constant relative risk aversion, the
results showed that the risk attitudes of farmers have positive and significant effects on the
decision to adopt new irrigation technologies. As a result, risk averse farmers were more
likely to adopt new irrigation technologies that allowed them to save water and reduce
production risk during the times of water shortage. Beside the risk aversion factor, the study
found that location, debt level, education, and age were important determinants in the decision
to adopt new irrigation technologies. Education had a positive effect on the probability of
adoption and age had a negative effect on the probability of adoption. Not surprisingly, farms
located in arid areas were more likely to adopt new water irrigation technologies.
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Using as somewhat different approach, Isik and Khanna (2003) employed a nonlinear
mean-standard deviation expected utility function to determine the impacts of risk aversion
and uncertainty about weather and soil conditions on the decision to adopt site-specific
technologies and the levels of cost-share subsidies required to induce adoption. The study
found that uncertainty and risk-aversion had negative impacts on adoption decisions such that
ignoring risk aversion and uncertainty would overestimate the economic and environmental
benefits of site specific technologies and underestimate the subsidy level required to
encourage adoption. Abadi Ghadim et al. (2005) analyzed the importance of uncertainty and
risk aversion in decisions to adopt crop innovation in Western Australia. Farmers were
interviewed over a three-year span to elicit their risk preferences and risk perceptions
concerning a new crop technology for the area (chickpeas). In the survey, farmers were asked
if they would adopt the new crop and how much area they would devote to it. Two limiteddependent variable models (probit and Tobit models) were used to analyze the responses. The
study found that risk aversion negatively influenced both the decision to adopt and the extent
of adoption, with risk aversion reducing adoption to a greater extent when both the perceived
riskiness of the new technology and the area of the farm suitable for chickpeas were large.
A shortcoming of the empirical studies summarized above (with the exception of
Koundouri et al. (2006)) is that they ignore the dynamic aspect of the investment decision – a
factor that might be very important in the context of wetland restoration. Even though these
empirical models adequately explain why some landowners choose to invest or not to invest
at a given time, they fail to explain why some landowners choose to delay investment and
wait for more information.
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2.3 Option Values and Investme nt Decisions
Risk aversion is known to play an important role in static decision making under
uncertainty, but it may be of less importance in a dynamic context (Knapp and Olson, 1996).
Instead, the value of information tends to be the most important factor affecting dynamic
decision making. In option theory literature, the value of information is called the option
value of an investment and, if measured correctly, can have a profound effect on the decisionmaking process of landowners (Dixit and Pindyck (1994)). The majority of the real option
models have been developed under risk neutral assumptions, and they do not allow the effect
of risk aversion to be incorporated. This section summarizes the finding of empirical studies
that have examined the role of option value on investment decisions, particularly in decisions
similar to those of wetland restoration and maintenance.
Focusing on the relationship between the option value to convert and the valuation of
the conservation easements, Tegene et al. (1999) examined decisions to convert farmland to
urban use using an option value model. . The study showed that uncertainty and the growth in
the urban return increase the threshold value of the conversion, so the landowner will not
convert farmland to urban land use when the value of the land in urban use is equal to the
direct opportunity cost of the land. Rather, landowners will convert only when urban land
values exceed the opportunity cost of the land by a large margin. Hence, an increase in
uncertainty and a growth of returns to urban use tends to increase the value of the convertible
agricultural land by increasing the land option value, causing a delay in development even for
a risk-neutral landowner. This suggests that not incorporating the option values in the
conservation easements offered to the landowners might under-price the values of the
conservation easements and make landowners reluctant to sign up for these easements. In
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another study, Quigg (1993) examined the difference in the value of vacant and developed
land by applying an option values model to a large sample of real estate transactions in
Seattle. The author found that the option value associated with uncertainty and irreversibility
in the decision to develop explains the difference in these values of the different types of land.
The author calculated a premium for the option value to wait, and found that this option
premium averaged about 6% with a range from 1% to 30% for the total sample.
Looking at a more subtle type of land conversion, Schatzki (2003) examined the
effects of uncertainty and sunk costs on the decisions to convert land from agricultural to
forestry use using a sample of agricultural plots in the state of Georgia. Empirical results
suggested that uncertainty in returns to either forestry or agricultural use increases the
conversion threshold and thus decreases the likelihood of conversion. The results also showed
that the higher the correlation between changes in returns to agriculture and forests, the lower
the conversion threshold, thus increasing the likelihood of conversion. The estimated option
value for this study ranged from 7% to 81% of the expected value of the land asset.
In terms of program participation, Isik and Yang (2004) examined the factors affecting
farmer participation in the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) under uncertainty and
irreversibility using an option value model. Results showed that uncertainty and
irreversibility, and thus option values, influence farmer decisions to participate in CRP, with
higher levels of uncertainty in the returns to agricultural use or the CRP rental payments
decreasing the likelihood of participation in the CRP. In addition, land benefits, land
attributes, and farmer characteristics had significant impacts on the participation decision,
with age, higher production costs, and lower crop revenues increasing the probability of
participation in the CRP.
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Option values also play a role in technology adoption decisions. Winter-Nelson and
Amegbeto (1998) used an option value model to analyze the impacts of output price
variability and sunk costs on terrace adoption in eastern Kenya. Simulation results compared
the incentives to invest in terraces under both administered and world prices, showing that the
option value associated with the variability of world prices was an important factor in the
decision to invest in that the variability of world prices tended to delay terrace adoption in
Kenya. Purvis et al. (1995) investigate the impacts of uncertainty about the costs and
requirements associated with environmental compliance and sunk costs on a producer‟s
decision to invest in free-stall dairy housing. Empirical results demonstrated that, even
though free-stall dairy housing units increased milk production and reduced water pollution,
the uncertainty about the costs of the system and future environmental regulations
significantly delayed the adoption decision. More specifically, the simplified net present value
(NPV) rule predicted that a risk neutral producer will invest in free-stall technology if the
expected return of investment were equal to $83,448. The option-value investment rule,
however, predicted that the producer would wait until the expected return on investment was
greater than or equal to $190,063. This example demonstrates that uncertainty can
substantially increase the hurdle required to trigger adoption.
Continuing with the adoption theme, Carey and Zilberman (2002) used an option
value model to determine the effect of input uncertainty and emerging water markets on a
farmer‟s decision to adopt water irrigation technologies. The results indicated that farmers
value the option to wait when making technology adoption decisions, with the risk neutral
farmer being unwilling to invest in irrigation technologies until the expected value of
investment exceeds the cost by a large hurdle rate. Simulation results showed that, according
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to the net present value (NPV) rule, farms would invest in irrigation technologies if the
expected NPV was greater than or equal zero and the water market price was greater than or
equal $48 per unit. From an option value rule perspective, however, investments would only
occur if the expected NPV was greater than or equal to $1,594 per acre and the water market
price reached $112 per unit. Thus, the larger the level of uncertainty, the higher the hurdle rate
required to trigger adoption. Finally, the study found that the introduction of water markets
would likely induce farms with accessible water supplies to adopt earlier compared to farms
with scare water supply. This outcome was attributed primarily to the lack of a wellfunctioning water market.
In considering conservation measures, Bulte et al. (2002) looked at the optimal
holding of primary tropical forests in Costa Rica when the future nonuse benefits of forest
conservation are uncertain and increasing. The authors demonstrated that benefit uncertainty
has a significant and positive effect on the optimal forest holding stocks, with the option value
associated with the uncertainty being an important factor to consider. Thus, using
deterministic cost-benefit analysis can be misleading because it ignores the fact that the option
value associated with uncertainty is a component of the return to investment. The results also
showed that even though the effect of the uncertainty factor is substantial, rising trend s in
future benefits and compensation by the international community for beneficial spillovers
may be more important factors in determining the optimal forest stock.
In summary, previous studies have found education, technical assistance, conservation
attitudes, the perception of the erosion problem, and the degree of erosion to have positive
effects on the landowners‟ investment decisions. Age was negatively related to the decis ion to
invest in soil conservation and forestry, but it had a mixed sign with respect to the decisions to
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participate in government incentive programs. Income and property size did not have
consistent signs across all studies; however, the majority of the studies found positive
correlations between the decision to invest and total household income and property size.
Similarly, results from the literature were not consistent regarding the signs of the variables
cost-sharing and debt level. They were found to be negatively correlated to the decision to
invest in some studies and positively related to the decision to invest in other studies. Finally,
risk aversion was found to negatively influence the level of investment in both soil
conservation and forestry investment. However, risk aversion was found to have positive
(negative) effects on the decisions to adopt new technologies depending on whether these
technologies are risk decreasing or risk increasing. Some studies found a negative
relationship between risk aversion and technology adoption, and other studies found a positive
relationship between risk aversion and technology adoption.
The discussion in this chapter focused on identifying the landowner and land
characteristics, along with institutional structures, previously linked to private decisions about
land use. The next chapter will present a theoretical model of landowner decision making in
the face of uncertainty and fixed costs, particularly with respect to how uncertainty about the
benefits and costs of wetland restoration and maintenance influences a landowner‟s
investment decision.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS
This chapter presents the development of a theoretical model describing a landowner ‟s
investment decision making process with respect to investments in wetland restoration and
maintenance when these decisions are made under uncertainty, irreversibility, and high fixed
costs. The first section presents a simple wetland restoration model when future benefits and
costs of wetland restoration and maintenance are known with certainty. The second section
extends the basic investment model to incorporate the effects of risk and uncertainty through
risk aversion channels. The next section extends the basic model to include risk and
uncertainty through the option value of investments, also known in the environmental
literature as the conditional value of information. The final section extends the model to
include the effects of some potential subsidy programs.
3.1 Investment Under Certainty: Net Present Value (NPV) Approach
Assume that a risk neutral landowner owns a property size At at time t. Part of this
property is wetland, denoted by wt, and the rest of the property (At-wt) is upland. Following
the Zhao and Zilberman (1999) and Parks (1993) model specifications, let
private net benefit derived from wetland acreage

be the

. This net benefit can be written as

follows:
(1)
where

is the total revenue and

is the total cost derived from the wetland

resource.
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Now assume that there is wetland loss equal to

. For a risk neutral landowner, the

decision problem is to choose the optimal level of restoration It that maximizes the present
value of the expected net benefits from the wetland resource over all future time periods 1 , or
(2)

subject to

;

where E is the expectations operator, δ is the discount rate, and

and

and variable costs (respectively) associated with restoration level

. The constraint defines

the change in wetland acreage at the end of period t (
the level of restoration It and the wetland loss
be increasing and concave in
function
for all

are the fixed

). This change is a function of both

. The net benefit function

, so that

and

is assumed to

. In addition, the variable cost

is assumed to be increasing and convex in It so that

and

. If the cost per unit of wetland restoration is constant, then

.

The traditional net present value (NPV) model of investment predicts that the
landowners will invest in wetland restoration and maintenance activities when the NPV of the
expected cash flows from the investment exceeds the cost of the investment. Therefore, the
landowner will invest in wetland restoration and maintenance if
invest in wetland restoration and maintenance if

, and he/she will not

. Thus, the landowner maximization

problem for each time period can be expressed as follows:
(3)

1

The plus infinity symbol that was used in the net present value function represents the end of the
landowner‟s planning horizon
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subject to
The landowner‟s optimal wetland restoration level can then be found by solving the
Hamiltonian function:
(4)
whose first-order conditions for maximization are:

(4.1)

(4.2)

(4.3)

(4.4)
From equations 4.1 and 4.2, the landowner will choose a level of restoration that satisfies the
following relationship:

(5)

The term in the left hand side (LHS) of equation (5) can be interpreted as the marginal
benefits associated with restoration level

, while the first term on the right hand side (RHS)

can be interpreted as the marginal cost associated with restoration level

. The second term

on the RHS can be interpreted as the marginal negative benefits (i.e., costs) associated with αt
wetland loss. Thus, equation (5) states that under certainty, a landowner will optimize NPV by
choosing a level of restoration

that equates the marginal benefit of restoration with the
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marginal cost of restoration plus the marginal negative benefit associated with wetland loss
that might occur in the absence of no action. On the other hand, the landowner will prefer not
to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance if the additional benefit of restoration is less
than the sum of the marginal cost of restoration plus marginal negative benefit associated with
wetland loss.
3.2 Investment under Uncertainty
The simple NPV model has a major shortcoming in that it ignores the role of risk and
uncertainty in the decision- making process. In the context of coastal wetland restoration,
several sources of uncertainty can arise. First, there is uncertainty associated with changes in
the global climate that may result in sea level rise and/or adverse weather variations, such as
the increased frequency of hurricanes and storms. Currently, sea-level rise is estimated to be
approximately 1cm/yr, and this rate is expected to increase to 30 to 50cm by the end of 21 st
century (Day et al. 2005). The potential impact of future sea level rise on wetland restoration
and maintenance projects is unknown at the time the investment decisions are made. The
same can be said for the uncertainty associated with the use and performance of various
wetland restoration technologies. Another possible source of uncertainty is related to future
changes in wetland regulation and incentive policies. The evolution of these policies over
time will almost certainly influence the ultimate benefits and costs generated by current
wetland restoration and maintenance projects.
The uncertainty associated with climate change, restoration technologies, and wetland
policy can influence the landowner‟s decision process through several channels. First, risk
averse landowners might prefer not to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance activities
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because such investments would expose them to high levels of income risks even if they can
realize higher average returns under the investments (Arrow, 1971, Pratt 1964). On the other
hand, risk-averse landowners who have faced continuous wetland losses might consider
investing in wetland restoration projects in order to reduce the risk of losing more wetlands in
the future. In this case, the benefits of wetland restoration and maintenance potentially include
loss-based risk reduction. In addition to the uncertainty factor, investment in wetland
restoration and maintenance incurs fixed and variable costs that might be quite high due to the
need for extensive water control structures and compliance with wetland regulatory
constraints. Zhao and Zilberman (1999) demonstrated, using dynamic analysis, that high fixed
costs reduces the level of private restoration for each time period. In fact, if the fixed costs
are high enough, it can lead to a complete lack of private restoration regardless of the
magnitude of marginal costs. This combination of uncertainty and fixed costs implies that
additional information about the future benefits and costs of wetland restoration and
maintenance might have positive economic value. Therefore, a risk neutral la ndowner should
prefer to delay investment in wetland restoration and maintenance in order to gain more
information and avoid the downside risk of a costly restoration project (Arrow and Fisher
1973; Henry 1974; Fisher and Hanemann 1990; Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Consequently, a
simple NPV rule tends to underestimate the required trigger value for an uncertain investment
decision, and it might lead to an early or overinvestment. In the next section, the NPV model
is extended to account for the importance of risk aversion.
3.2.1. The Role of Risk Aversion
At the time a landowner makes the decision to invest in wetland restoration projects, the
expected net benefit of a wetland restoration project is subject to several sources of
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uncertainty including future climate change, future changes in wetland policy, and future
improvement of wetland restoration technology. For the sake of this discussion, assume that
the main source of uncertainty the landowner faces is the uncertainty about future climate
change, and this uncertainty is represented by a random variable
density function

with the distribution

. To account for the effects of risk aversion and uncertainty on the

landowner ‟s investment decision, the landowner ‟s objective function described in equation (2)
must be restructured to incorporate the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function (u) for the
net benefit of wetland restoration. The landowner ‟s decision problem is to choose the optimal
level of restoration It that maximizes the present value of the expected utility of the net
benefits from the wetland, or
(6)

subject to
where E is the expectation operator, u(.) is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function that
is continuous and twice differentiable, with positive first derivatives ( u ' ). The sign of the
second derivative ( u " ) is negative for a risk-averse landowner and positive for a risk-taking
landowner. Based on this model specification, investment in wetland restoration and
maintenance occurs only if the expected discounted utility of the benefits of wetland
restoration exceeds the discounted utility of the restoration costs (i.e., V2 >0).
The landowner maximization problem for each time period can be expressed as follows:
(7)

subject to
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The Hamiltonian function for this dynamic problem is:
(8)
with the first-order conditions for maximization

(8.1)

(8.2)

(8.3)

(8.4)
Equations (8.1) and (8.2) can be combined to yield

(9)

Using the property of the expected value of the product of two random variables,

(10)

Simplifying
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(11)

or

(12)
The term on the LHS of equation (11) is the expected marginal benefits associated with
restoration level
restoring

. The first term on the RHS is the expected marginal cost associated with

acres of wetland, while the second term is the expected marginal negative benefit

(costs) associated with αt wetland loss. The third term on the RHS is different from zero in
the uncertainty case and measures the deviation of the risk-averse landowner from a riskneutral landowner. It represents the additional cost of risk and it is a function of both the risk
preference of the landowner (captured by the curvature of the utility function) and the
variability of the net benefit represented by the variance of the net benefit. This tern will be
positive for a risk averse landowner and negative for a risk taker landowner. In this
formulation, a landowner will choose the optimal level of restoration according to the
expected net benefit of wetland restoration, expected cost of wetland restoration, negative
opportunity cost of wetland loss, risk preference, and the variability of wetland net benefit.
Therefore, a risk-averse landowner will invest in wetland restoration and maintenance as long
as the expected marginal benefit of wetland restoration exceeds the expected marginal cost
plus the expected negative marginal benefit and an additional risk premium associated with
wetland investment.
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3.2.2 The Value of Information (Option Value Approach)
Investment in wetland restoration and maintenance has all three characteristics that
define real options. First, the decision to invest is, in general, irreversible because it involves
considerable (in fact, a high percentage of) fixed and variable costs that cannot be totally
recovered if the investment decision is reversed. Second, the decision to invest in wetland
restoration and maintenance is uncertain because the economic and environmental conditions
that influence the return on investment are uncertain, with information about these conditions
only arriving gradually in the future. Third, the landowner has the choice to delay investment
in wetland restoration and maintenance and wait for more information to arrive before
undertaking costly restoration projects. When the conditions of irreversibility, uncerta inty and
the ability to wait are met, the decisions are said to entail an option value, where it pays for
the landowners to delay investments and wait for more information in order to avoid the
downside risk (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Investment in wetland restoration and maintenance
should occur only when the discounted cash flows from the investment exceed the costs of the
investment by a large hurdle equal to the value of the option to invest in the future; a value
known in the environmental preservation literature as the quasi-option value (Arrow and
Fisher, 1973; Henry, 1974). The quasi-option value (or option value) measures the value of
information conditional on delaying investment in the first period. The higher the prospect of
receiving new information about future returns of investment, the more likely the landowners
will delay partial investments in order to remain flexible and make use of the new
information.
In order to account for the option value associated with wetland restoration decisions,
the landowner‟s decision model can be based on real option theory (ROT) for investments
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under uncertainty and irreversibility (Arrow and Fisher, 1973; Henry, 1974; Dixit & Pindyck,
1994; Epstein, 1980). Several authors have used ROT models for analyzing investment
decisions, including those associated with technology adoption ( Carey and Zilberman, 2002;
Isik 2004; Isik et al., 2001,; Koundouri et al., 2006; Winter-Nelson and Amegbeto, 1998),
land use change (Capozza and Li, 1994; Capozza and Hensley, 1990; Capozza and Sick,
1994; Geltner et al., 1996; Plantinga et al. 2002; Purvis et al., 1995; Tengene et al. 1999;
Wiemers and Behan, 2004), program participation by farmers (Isik and Yang, 2004), and
forest conservation (Bulte et al., 2002), and wetland investment (Paulsen, 2007).
In order to examine a similar model in the context of wetland restoration, assume that
a risk neutral landowner holds a property size At at time t. Part of this property is wetland,
denoted by wt , and the rest of the property (At-wt) is upland. Let
benefit derived from wetland acreage

at time t, where the value of

be the private net
is a function of

several exogenous factors such as global climate change, changes in wetland policies, and
restoration technologies. Also assume that new information about the uncertain benefit of
wetland restoration will gradually become available, so that this benefit might be modeled
using a geometric Brownian motion:
(13)
where α and σ are the growth rate and the variation in the growth rate of the wetland
restoration benefit, respectively. Define
and

as the increment of the Weiner process,

. Thus, equation (13) implies that the current net benefits of wetland

restoration and maintenance are known, but future benefits are changing at rate α (Dixit &
Pindyck (1994)). Investing in wetland restoration and maintenance also requires
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consideration of the fixed and variable costs (

and

respectively), where C denotes

the total investment costs equal to the sum of the variable and fixed costs. Taking the benefits
and costs together, the option to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance is then equal to
the maximum difference between the discounted net benefit of investment and the cost of the
investment
(14)

where E denotes the expectations operator, T is the unknown future time that the landowner
will start the restoration project,

is the net benefit of the wetland restoration at the

time of restoration T, and δ is the discount rate. In order for investment in wetland restoration
to be optimal, we assumed that δ> α which implies that the trend in the net benefit of wetland
restoration should always be less than the discount rate. The goal, then, is to solve equation
(14) to find the optimal value B* that maximizes the option value of investment in wetland
restoration and maintenance F(B).
Dixit & Pindyck (1994) use a dynamic programming approach to solve for optimal
investment regions in problems like the one specified above, and they found that the optimal
solution can be expressed as:

(15)

where C is the cost of the restoration investment and β is a function of the discount rate, drift
and volatility of the stochastic process

. The term

has a value greater than 1 and

measures the importance of uncertainty in the investment decision. Specifically, in the
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presence of uncertainty, one would invest in wetland restoration and maintenance when the
net benefits of the investment exceed the investment cost by a hurdle rate equal to the option
value of investment. Dixit & Pindyck (1994) go on to show that the critical value of the
investment B* is increasing in the volatility of the growth rate (σ) and trend (α) of net benefit
Although this modeling approach is appealing, it is difficult to test the model‟s
implications because of the intense data requirements. Thus, the majority of studies regarding
land use under uncertainty and irreversibility tended to rely on simulation frameworks, where
Mont-Carlo or other simulation methods are used to test the implication of the ROT model.
3.3. Implications for a Potential Wetland Restoration Policy
Caffey et al. (2003) listed several policy instruments that can be used to encourage
private wetland restoration in the coastal zone, including cost-sharing subsidies, tax reduction,
wetland mitigating banking, and carbon credits. As an example of how these can be
incorporated into the theoretical model, consider the effects of cost-sharing subsidies such as
the one offered under Wetland Reserve Program (WRP) or Conservation Reserve Program
(CRP). Under the WRP, landowners can enter a contract agreement with the government to
reach certain restoration goals, and in exchange they receive rental payments over the contract
period. The program also pays a portion of the total restoration costs. It is worth mentioning
that subsidy programs such as WRP and CRP were largely designed to address the issue of
wetland restoration for land that was devoted to agricultural uses, but modified versions of
these programs can potentially be used to address the issue of wetland restoration in the
coastal zone (Ryan and Susman, 2003).
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Suppose that a coastal landowner participates in a cost sharing program similar to one
under the WRP, where the landowner will receive a dollar rental payment equal to s per acre
over the contract period k, and the program will pay a portion γ of the total restoration costs.
The landowner‟s decision problem, including the new benefits of the subsidy program, can be
expressed as follows:

(16)

subject to
The landowner‟s maximization problem for each time period can be expressed as:
(17)

subject to
Notice that the cost-share subsidy program adds two terms to the maximization problem – the
cost share portion that the pays
period k,

and the rental payment over the contract
.

Setting the Hamiltonian function to solve the optimization problem in equation 17 yields:

(18)
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The first-order conditions for maximization can then be expressed as:
(18.1)

(18.2)

(18.3)

(18.4)
Combining equations (18.1) and (18.2) yields

(19)

Then, using the property of the expected value of the product of two random variables,

(20)

or

(21)
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Simplifying yields

(22)

The term on the LHS of the equation above is the expected marginal benefits associated
with restoration level . The first term on the RHS is the expected marginal cost associated
with restoring

acres of wetland, while the second term is the expected marginal negative

benefit associated with αt wetland loss. The third term on the RHS is the increase in the
marginal benefit of wetland restoration due to cost-share subsidy programs. The last term on
the RHS is non- zero to the extent that it measures the deviation of the risk-averse landowner
from a risk- neutral landowner. It represents the additional cost of risk and it is negative for a
risk averse landowner, and positive for a risk taker landowner. From equation (22), the
subsidy payment

and the cost share payment

lower the

hurdle rate for investment in wetland restoration and maintenance. Therefore, the subsidy
program should encourage private landowners to undertake wetland restoration and
maintenance.
This chapter presented the conditions under which the landowners would invest in
wetland restoration and maintenance, finding that uncertainty and fixed costs can play
important role in the decision making process. In a static setting, risk-aversion influences the
trigger value of the decision to invest in wetland restoration projects. However, in a dynamic
setting, the option value of investment under uncertainty influences the decision making
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process of the landowners. The remainder of the dissertation develops these ideas in an
empirical context with the goal of testing the theoretical implications of this model structure.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
The theoretical framework for the landowners‟ decisions to invest in wetland
restoration and maintenance in the presence of risk and uncertainty was developed in both
static and dynamic contexts. The static framework emphasized the role of risk aversion in the
decision process, while the dynamic framework emphasized the role of option value in the
decision process. This chapter develops an empirical model for the factors that influence
decisions to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. Given that the data for the study
came from a cross sectional survey, the empirical model focuses on analyzing the factors that
influence the landowner‟s decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance in the
presence of risk and uncertainty at the time the survey was taken. Hence, the model developed
here is grounded in the static framework approach and emphasizes the important role of risk
aversion and fixed costs in the landowners‟ decision process.
The majority of studies that have looked at factors influencing private investments in
resource stocks similar to wetlands have either used discrete choice models with probit or
logit estimators (Romm et al., 1987; Soule et al., 2000; Koundouri et al., 2006) or a corner
solution model employing a Tobit model (Norris and Batie, 1987; Featherstone and Goodwin,
1993; Hagos and Holden, 2006). The first modeling approach provides useful information on
how different characteristics of the landowners and their wetland tracts influence the
probability of investment in wetland restoration and maintenance, but it does not provide
information on the impact of these factors on the level of investment in wetland restoration
and maintenance. Since the objective of this study was to provide information on the level-ofinvestment decision, using a discrete choice model is not optimal. The Tobit model, on the
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other hand, is particularly useful for analyzing the impacts of landowners‟ characteristic and
their properties on the probability and the level of investment in wetland res toration and
maintenance. In addition, the marginal effects calculated from the estimated Tobit model can
be used to predict the effects of changing the levels of explanatory variables on both the
amount of investment and the probability of investment. The Tobit model, however, is very
restrictive in its parameterization. First, it assumes that the same stochastic process influences
the probability of investment and the level of investment. Second, all zero observations of the
dependent variable are attributed to corner solutions (Blundell and Meghir, 1987; Moffatt,
2005). Because of these limitations, we explore an alternative approach to modeling the data
structure – the double-hurdle model. The double-hurdle model generalizes the Tobit model by
introducing an additional hurdle which must be passed before observing any positive
investments. The additional hurdle uses a probit estimator to model the decision to
invest(discrete variable); therefore, zero observations on the dependent variable can be either
attributed to corner solutions or nonparticipation in the market (i.e., landowners have never
invested in wetland restoration projects). In doing so, the double hurdle model also allows the
decision to invest in wetland restoration and the level of investments to be treated separately.
Therefore, a separate stochastic process can be used to model the probability of investment
and the level of investment (Carroll et al., 2005).
After briefly introducing the underlying theory of the Tobit model and its limitations,
the discussion in this chapter turns to the double hurdle model as an alternative to the Tobit.
Also presented is a brief section on how the marginal effects are computed and the associated
standard errors for statistical inferences. To close, the last section of the chapter discusses the
issues of heteroskedasticity and non- normality of the error terms in the double hurdle model.
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4.1 The Tobit Model
Estimating an econometric model of landowner decisions to invest in wetland
restoration and maintenance is complicated by the relatively large number of zero
observations that are usually observed in the dependent variable (i.e., level of private
investment in wetland restoration and maintenance). When the dependent variable is limited
in such a way, analyzing the data using ordinary least square (OLS) may result in biased and
inconsistent estimated parameter (Amemiya, 1984). Discarding zero observations of the
dependent variable is not a viable solution, as doing so and using OLS only with positive
values of the dependent variable increases the potential bias and inefficiency while ignoring
potentially valuable information embedded in the zero observation responses. (Amemiya,
1984). To address these limitations, Tobin (1958) crafted an approach that came to be known
as the Tobit model. To account for the censored nature of data, the Tobit model expresses the
observed response variable y in terms of an underlying latent variable:
if

(23)

if

where

(24)

is a latent variable describing the level of investment for landowner ,

is the

actual level of investment for a landowner , x i is a vector of potential explanatory variables
that influence the landowner‟s decisions to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance, β is
a vector of the associated parameters, and
the same as the density of

is the error term. The density of

given x i is

given x i for positive observations, so the probability that

equals 0 can be expressed as
41

(25)
where (.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution.
The most common approach to estimating the Tobit model is the maximum likelihood
estimator. First, the observations are divided into two groups; censored observations (zero
values of the dependent variable) and the observed positive values of the dependent variable.
The log likelihood function for the Tobit model is expressed as follows:
(26)

where (.) and φ(.) are the standard normal cumulative distribution and the standard normal
density functions, “0” indicates summation over zero observations, and “+” indicates the
summation over positive observations(Greene, 2003).
The parameter estimates of the Tobit model provide little value besides indicating the
significance of the explanatory variable and, if significant, the direction (positive or negative)
of its influence on the dependent variable. Thus, marginal effects are calculated from the
estimated model to more fully understand the magnitude of the relationship between the
explanatory and dependent variables. Using the McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decomposition,
the unconditional expected value of the double hurdle model was expressed by Wooldridge
(2002) as
(27)
From equation (23), the probability of observing a positive investment level for landowner

is

(28)
while the conditional expected value of

given that
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is

(29)
where (.) is the inverse mills ratio

. Using the McDonald and Moffitt (1980)

decomposition, the unconditional expected value of

that measures the overall investment

level is
(30)
Taking the first derivative of equations (28), (29), and (30) with respect to the explanatory
variable x j then gives the marginal effects on the probability of investment and the conditional
and unconditional level of investments. Thus, the marginal effect of the variable x j on the
probability of investment is
(31)

the conditional marginal effect of the variable x j is
(32)

and the unconditional marginal effect of the variable x j is
(33)

The Tobit model suffers from a number of limitations associated with its underlying
assumptions. First, the model is very restrictive in its parameterization because it assumes that
the same stochastic process determines both the value of the continuous dependent variable
(level of private investments in wetland restoration and maintenance) and the value of the
discrete dependent variable (the decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance).
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This assumption is very restrictive because the factors that affect a landowner‟s decision to
invest in wetland restoration and maintenance (i.e., the characteristics of the landowners and
their properties) might differ significantly from the factors that influence a landowner‟s
decision about how much to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. Furthermore, the
same stochastic process assumption implies that if a particular variable is known to have a
positive effect on investment level, then a high value for this variable will inevitably lead to
the prediction of a high probability of investment (Blundell and Meghir, 1987; Moffatt, 2005).
Second, the Tobit model assumes that all zero observations are standard corner solutions or
negative values of the underlying latent variable (Blundell and Meghir, 1987). In the context
of our study, it is possible to imagine cases where the landowners do not invest in wetland
restoration and maintenance for reasons beyond simple economic factors such as income and
relative prices. For example, landowners might decide not to invest in wetland restoration
and maintenance because they don‟t believe a wetland restoration technology exists to do the
task or because they do not believe that they are responsible for restoration, especially
considering that the majority of wetland benefits are public in nature (Heimlich et al. 1998). It
is also possible that landowners may perceive wetland investment to be beneficial (i.e.,
positive value of the latent variable), but for other unmeasured reasons choose not to invest,
thus yielding zero values for the dependent variable.
Unlike the Tobit model, the double-hurdle model allows the decision to invest in
wetland restoration and the level of investments to be treated separately. Therefore, a separate
stochastic process can be used to model the probability of investment and the level of
investments. The next section presents the general function of the double hurdle model and
discusses its underlying assumptions.
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4.2 Double Hurdle Model
The double hurdle model proposed by Cragg (1971) generalizes the Tobit model by
introducing an additional hurdle which must be passed before observing any positive
investments. Conceptually, a landowner first decides whether or not to invest in wetland
restoration and maintenance. Then, if the decision is made to invest, the landowner decides
how much to invest. A different latent variable is used to model each d ecision process, with a
probit estimator used to model the participation decision and a Tobit estimator used to model
the level of investment decision (Blundell and Meghir, 1987). 2 Therefore, the double hurdle
model allows for the possibility that factors affecting the decision to invest in wetland
restoration and maintenance might differ from factors that affect the level of investment
decision. For example, fixed costs may affect the decisions to invest in wetland restoration
and maintenance, but they may not affect the decisions about how much to invest. In addition,
the double-hurdle model allows the same explanatory variable to have different impacts on
the decisions to invest and the level of investment.
Unlike the Tobit model, which assumes that all zero observation on the dependent
variable are attributed to corner solutions, the double hurdle model allows zero observations
on the dependent variables to be caused by either a simple corner solution (negative value for
the underlying latent dependent variable) or non-participation in the market (i.e., landowner
decides not to invest in wetland restoration projects for some non- modeled reasons) (Moffatt,
2005; Carroll et al., 2005). The general equations of the double-hurdle model can expressed
as follows:
2

The double hurdle model uses a probit model, and not a logit model, in the first stage because the normality
assumption of the error term matches the underlying assumptio n for the Tobit model. Since both the decision to
invest and how much to invest are based on the same underlying utility function, then the error terms in both
model should follow the same d istributional assumptions.
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: first hurdle equation (investment decision)

(34)

: second hurdle equation (investment level decision)

(35)

if

and

(36)

otherwise

(37)

,
where

is a latent variable representing the decision to invest in wetland restoration and

maintenance for a landowner ,
a landowner ,

is a latent variable representing the level of investment for

is the observed level of investment for a landowner , zi is a vector of

potential explanatory variables that influence the landowner‟s decision to invest in wetland
restoration and maintenance, xi is a vector of explanatory variables that affect the
landowner‟s level of investment, and α and β are vectors of parameter. In this formulation, (zi
; x i ) may contain the same common explanatory variables, although their corresponding
effects on the two hurdle equations might be quite different. The terms
and independently distributed error terms such that

are normal

(Carroll et al., 2005).

As might be apparent from this discussion, the Tobit model is just a special case of the
double-hurdle model, where zi = x i and α = β/σ. As a result, the model specification of the
double-hurdle model can be tested against the Tobit model using a likelihood ratio test (LR).
The LR test compares the log- likelihood values of the two models and determines if they are
significantly different from each other (Wooldridge, 2002). The result of this test can be used
to determine whether the landowners make investment decisions in a sequential or
simultaneous manner. If the LR test rejects the null hypothesis of a univariate Tobit, then the
double-hurdle model is preferred and landowners are found to make investment decisions in a
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sequential two-step process. If, however, the null hypothesis is not rejected, then landowners
are found to make investment decision in a simultaneous manner and the univariate Tobit is a
better representation of the data.
As in the Tobit model case, the most common method for estimating the doublehurdle model is the maximum likelihood estimator, and its general log- likelihood function can
be expressed as follows (Cragg, 1971):

(38)

where “0” indicates summation over zero observations, “+” indicates the summation over
positive observations, and

(.) and φ(.) are the standard normal cumulative distribution and

the standard normal density function, respectively.
Similar to the Tobit model, the parameter estimates of the double hurdle model
provide little direct information beyond the significance and direction of influence for each
explanatory variable, resulting in the need for marginal effect calculations. Using the
McDonald and Moffitt (1980) decomposition, the unconditional expected value of the double
hurdle model can be expressed as (Jensen and Yen, 1996)
(39)
where

is the probability of investment and

is the conditional

expected value of investment (i.e., the level of investment conditional on having made the
choice to invest). Following Burke‟s (2009) notation, the probability of investment is
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(40)
.From the Tobit model in the second- hurdle, the conditional expected value of y given that
y>0 is
(41)
where λ(.) is the inverse Mills ratio. After substituting equations (40) and (41) into equation
(39), the unconditional expected value of y can be expressed as follows
(42)
Taking the first derivative of equations (40), (41), and (42) with respect to the explanatory
variable x j yields the double-hurdle marginal effects of the explanatory variable x j on the
probability of investment and the conditional and unconditional level of investments. So, the
marginal effect of the explanatory variable x j on the probability of investment is expressed as
(43)

and the conditional marginal effect of the explanatory variable x j given that landowners have
made a positive investment is

(44)

and the unconditional marginal effect of the explanatory variable x j is

(45)
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Although having the calculated marginal effects is useful, for statistical inference there
is a need for the standard errors of the estimated marginal effects. These standard errors can
be approximated using the delta method. Denoting the parameter estima tes of the double
hurdle model by the vector
continuous variable
marginal effect

and the estimated marginal effect for a given

in the model by the function

, the estimated variance of the

using the delta method can be expressed as (Wooldridge, 2002):
(46)

where

is the asymptotic variance of the maximum likelihood estimator for

and the

standard errors can be computed using the square root of the equation above. This procedure
is employed by the „nlcom’ subroutine in STATA to calculate the standard errors for the
estimated marginal effects of the double hurdle model.
4.3 Heteroskedasticity and Non-normality
The maximum likelihood estimates of the double hurdle model are derived under the
assumption that the error terms

and

are homoskedastic. In the case of cross-sectional

data, this homoskedasticity assumption is likely to be violated, leading to a situation where
the maximum likelihood estimation produces inconsistent parameter estimates ( Arabmazer
and Schmidt, 1981; Maddala, 1975; Hurd, 1979). Arabmazer and Schmidt (1981) investigated
the impact of heteroskedasticity in the Tobit model and found that the size of inconsistency 3
increases with heteroskedasticity and the degree of censoring. Hurd (1979) found that

3

Consistency is a very important characteristic of any estimator. It reflects the behavior of the sampling
distribution of the estimator as the sample size increases. An estimator is said to be consistent if it converges to
the parameter estimates of the true population value of the parameter as the sample size increases indefinitely
(Wooldridge,2002)
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moderate heteroskedasticity in the errors will cause substantial inconsistency in the parameter
estimates. One way to overcome the inconsistency is by assuming that the standard deviation
of the error term is a function of a set of exogenous variables
(47)
where

might contain all continuous variables in

or just a subset of the continuous

variables suspected for heteroskedasticity and δ is a conformable parameter vector (Su and
Yen, 1996; Jenson and Yen, 1996). A likelihood ratio test (LR) can be used to test the
restrictions (Ho:

=0) against the alternative that

is not 0. A rejection of this test indicates

that the errors are heteroskedastic.
Similar to the case of heteroskedasticity, the maximum likelihood estimates of the
double hurdle model are very sensitive to the normality assumptions concerning the error
terms

and

. If normality is violated, the maximum likelihood approach produces

inconsistent parameter estimates (Arabmazer and Schmidt, 1982). One way of dealing with
the non-normality issue is to use a logarithmic transformation of the dependent variable, but
this option is not appropriate in the presence of a large number of zero observations. Another
way to account for non-normal errors is to use a Box-Cox transformation of the dependent
variable, often expressed as (Jenson and Yen, 1996)

(48)

Notice that the logarithmic and the linear transformations are special cases of the Box-Cox
transformation when =0 , and =1, respectively. In general, however, would be expected
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to take on a value between zero and one (Moffatt, 2005). The log likelihood function of the
double hurdle model after applying the Box-Cox transformation can be expressed as

(49)

This chapter presented two potential models (Tobit and the double hurdle) that can be
used to investigate landowners‟ decisions concerning investment in wetland restoration
projects. The next chapter examines the process used to collect the data needed to statistically
estimate these models and gives an over-review of the data itself.
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CHAPTER 5
SURVEY DESIGN AND DATA SUMMARY
Chapter 4 presented an empirical framework for modeling the landowner decision
making process with respect to wetland restoration and maintenance. From the theoretical
framework discussed in Chapter 3, risk aversion becomes a key determinant of the
landowners‟ investment decisions. In order to test this theoretical hypothesis, however, a
measure of the risk preferences for private landowners is required. A survey of coastal
landowners in Louisiana was conducted in the fall of 2009 in order to elicit these risk
preferences. Three different risk preference elicitation methods were used in the survey: 1) a
self ranking question on risk preference; 2) a multi- item scale approach; and 3) the expected
utility framework through hypothetical investments distributions with different levels of risk
and expected net returns. The survey was also used to collect other information regarding
landowners‟ investment decisions, their socioeconomic characteristics, and the characteristics
of landholdings. This chapter describes the survey process and presents a descriptive analysis
of the response. The chapter begins with an examination of the survey design and discusses
the general response characteristics. Next, the risk preference elicitation methods that were
used are described. Finally, a summary of the survey data is presented.
5.1 Survey Design and Response
The survey questionnaire (see Appendix A) was designed using Dillman‟s (1978) total
design method for mail surveys. A mailing list of private wetland landowners in coastal
Louisiana was obtained from the Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LADNR)
geographic information system (GIS) database. This database covers all coastal wetland
landowners who may have potentially been affected by wetlands loss and/or publically funded
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wetlands restoration and maintenance activities. In it raw form, the GIS database provided by
LADNR had 721 landowners with wetland properties in the coastal zone. However, after
eliminating duplicate names, names without mailing addresses, and publicly owned properties
(such as state-owned wildlife refuges), the mailing list contained a total of 591 landowners.
Using the 591 landowners as the sample frame, we stratified landowners into three
groups based on the number of wetland tracts they owned. The first group included all
landowners with only one tract of land. The second group included all landowners with two
tracts, and the third group included all landowners with more than two tracts (with this latter
group mainly consisting of large corporations). This stratification of the sample based on the
number of tracts was used for several reasons. First, the survey questionnaire asked questions
that are specific to a tract of land, such as the level of investment that was made, income
derived from the land, land use, and the level of wetland loss. Because a landowner with
multiple land tracts might make different investment decisions for each tract, it was important
to have the landowner focus on a specific tract when answering the questionnaire. Second,
stratification (and more specifically, having the responses tied to a specific tract of land)
allowed the response data to be merged with the LADNR GIS information for a land tract
(i.e., location of the land tract, distance from the shoreline, wetland loss, wetland area, and
wetland type).
For this study, the survey questionnaires were mailed to landowners with one or two
tracts of land (groups one and two). As mentioned early, the third group of landowners
consists mainly of large corporations, and they were excluded from this study in part due to
the difficulty in conceptualizing a way to elicit risk preferences from an entity other than an
individual. The behavior of these large landholders is certainly of interest when considering
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coastal wetland restoration and maintenance, and future research will need to focus on this
problem.
In early fall of 2009, a pre-test version of the survey questionnaire was mailed to a
random sample of 30 private landowners who owned one tract of land (group 1). Based on the
result of this pre-test, changes were made to the survey questionnaires and a final version was
mailed out to all landowners in the sample frame who owned one or two tracts of land (groups
1 and 2). In total, the survey was mailed to a sample size of 378 private landowners. 4 Each
survey questionnaire included an aerial photography map of the landowner ‟s property with
location data identified (see figure 5.1 for an example of one of these maps). For landowners
with two tracts of land, they were given two separate maps (one for each tract) and asked to
select the tract of land that they were going to use when answering the survey questionnaire.
As a result, all survey questions that were land-specific referred to well- identified tracts, and
thus could be related (both for this study and in the future) to biophysical features tracked by
other scientific studies.
The survey questionnaire consisted of five sections with a total of 37 questions. The first
section of the survey included a range of questions concerning the participation of the
landowners in government programs, their attitudes toward wetland restoration, and their
attitudes toward various incentive instruments for wetland restoration. More specifically,
landowners were asked about their general attitudes toward wetland restoration, whether they
were aware of any wetland restoration programs in their areas, and if so, whether they had
4

The entire survey process involved the follo wing steps. A pre-notification postcard was sent to all private
landowners, followed by a first mailing of the questionnaire; thank you reminder postcards were mailed out to
landowners shortly thereafter. Appro ximately two weeks later, a second mailing of the questionnaire was sent
out to all first mailing non-respondents, and shortly after that they were sent a second thank you reminder
postcard. Finally, a third mailing of the questionnaire was sent out to all landowners who did not respond in the
first two attempts. In all, six attempts were made to reach the landowners for a response.
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enrolled in any of these programs. They were also asked whether they would be willing to
participate in any government-sponsored restoration program and their attitudes toward
various incentive instruments such as tax breaks, subsidies, and cost sharing were elicited.
The second section of the survey was designed to collect information on the general
characteristics of landholdings, such as property size, percentage of wetland, current land use,
ownership type, when the property was first acquired, how it was managed, how much
wetland had been lost, the percentage of household income generated from both surface and
sub-surface activities, and the expected market value of the property. The third section of the
survey asked questions regarding investment in wetland resto ration and maintenance. In this
section, landowners were asked whether they had conducted any wetland restoration and
maintenance activities, the year in which they started these restoration projects, the type of
restoration techniques they had used, the level of private investment expenditures they had
made on wetland restoration and maintenance activities, and the level of public investment
expenditures that had been made on wetland restoration and maintenance activities. In this
section of the survey, the landowners were also asked about the factors that motivated or
deterred them from conducting wetland restoration and maintenance activities, their
perceptions about the source and level of uncertainty faced in wetland restoration and
maintenance activities, and their general attitudes toward wetland restoration and
maintenance. The fourth section included demographic questions, such as education, income,
age, gender, and place of residence. The final section of the survey elicited the landowners‟
risk preferences. Three risk preference elicitation methods were used: self ranking, multi- item
scale, and the direct expected utility method using hypothetical investment distributions with
different levels of returns and risk.
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Figure 5.1: An example of an ae rial photography map of a wetland tract in Louisiana’s
coastal zone. In the survey questionnaire, the boundary of the tract was clearly marked
and geospatial information about the location of the tract was also provided to help
respondents identify the wetland tract.
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Of the original 378 survey questionnaires that were mailed out, 48 were not deliverable
and 75 were returned completed. Removing the undelivered questionnaires from the sample,
the survey response rate was approximately 23%. The respondents owned a total of 393,680
acres, or approximately 57% of the total acreage owned by all 378 landowners in the sample
frame. In term of the total wetland acreage controlled by the survey respondents, we found
that survey respondents controlled approximately 6% of the total wetland acreage in
Louisiana‟s coastal zone (3.4 million acres). If one takes out the total wetland acreage owned
by the top 50 corporations and the lands owned by the state such national refuges and wildlife
management areas 5 in the sample frame, we found that the survey respondents controlled
about 11% of the total wetland acreage in the coastal zone of Louisiana based on a very
conservative assumption about the wetland percentage on these properties. Figure 5.2 presents
the distribution of the survey respondents across the coastal zone of Louisiana.
5.2 Risk Preference Elicitation Methods
Three risk preference elicitation instruments were employed to measure the risk
preferences of landowners: a self ranking question on risk preference, a multi- item scale
approach, and the expected utility framework through hypothetical investments distributions
with different levels of risk and expected net returns.
5.2.1 The Self Ranking Risk Method
Landowners were asked to rank their personal preferences for taking investment risks
using a 10-point scale, with 1 being risk-hating and 10 being risk- loving. Previous studies
5

The top 50 landowners in our samp le frame controlled appro ximately 2.7 million acres of land, but it is
unknown how much wetlands they controlled. Our survey data showed that, on average, landowners reported
that 76% of their propert ies are wet lands( see table 5.3). We used a more conservative estimate to estimate the
total wetland acreage controlled by the top 50 corporat ions. We used 50% rate as a base. Hence, it is estimated
that the top 50 corporations controlled about 1.35 million acres of wetlands. The wild life management areas in
the sample frame controlled about 554,215 acres of land in coastal zone of Louisiana .
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have employed the self ranking risk method (Cardona, 1999; Henderson, 2007; Thomas,
1987; Schurle and Tierney, 1990; Faust and Gillespie, 2006) and compared the self ranking
risk method to other risk elicitation methods, including interval and “closing- in” approaches
(Thomas, 1987; Schuler and Tierney, 1990; Bard and Barry, 2001; Faust and Gillespie, 2006).
The results of these studies are mixed, with some finding a significant correlation between
the self-ranking risk preference elicitation method and other methods (Schuler and Tierney,
1990; Thomas, 1987; Fausti and Gillespie, 2006) and others find no significant relationship
between the self- ranking method and other methods (Bard and Barry, 2001).

Figure 5.2: Distribution of the survey respondents across Louisiana’s Coastal zone.
5.2.2 Multi-ite m Scale Approach
In the psychological literature, the term “attitudes” refers to clusters of feelings,
beliefs, and behavioral tendencies that are not directly observable (Baron and Byrne, 1981).
Therefore, risk attitudes are latent variables that can be measured indirectly through a set of
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indicator variables that are correlated with these latent variables. To measure risk attitudes
using a multi- item scale approach, individuals are given a set of questions or items and asked
to indicate the degree to which they agree or disagree with each question. This approach was
found to perform well in terms of reliability and validity, and it is commonly used to measure
the risk preferences of individuals (Penning and Garcia, 2001). For this study, landowners
were asked to indicate on scale from 1 (” I strongly disagree”) to 5 (“ I strongly agree”) the
extent to which they agreed with a set of statements (Table 5.1) that were selected to „tap‟ the
domain of the construct as recommended by Churchill (1995). Example applications of the
scale approach can be found in the economic literature. Goodwin and Schroeder (1994)
measured the risk attitudes of farmers using a binary variable of whether the farmers had
preferences for business risk. Penning and Garcia (2001) measured the risk preferences of hog
farmers using the multi-scale approach, where the farmers were give seven statements and
asked to indicate the degree to which they agreed with each statement. The study found that
the risk attitudes measured using the multi- item scale approach were statistically related to
risk attitudes measured using the expected utility framework.
5.2.3 Investment Method
The investment method of risk elicitation used in this study closely followed the
experimental design developed by Gunjal and Legault (1996) and used the certainty
equivalence concept associated with the expected utility model. Table 5.2 presents the basic
structure of the experiment. The landowners were given seven investment distributions with
various levels of net returns and risks. Each investment distribution had three outcomes (low,
average, and high) with equal probability of any of the outcomes occurring. The landowners
were asked to select one of the investment distributions as being the most preferred, where the
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distributions were calculated using the Constant Partial Risk Aversion (CPRA) utility function
of the form:
and

where

is the certainty equivalent of the risky prospect

is the coefficient of risk aversion. The outcomes of the investment distributions were

calculated such that two adjacent investment distributions had the same expected utility value.
In addition, the investment distributions were generated under the implicit assumption that the
majority of landowners are risk averse. Landowners who selected investment options 1 to 4 in
Table 5.2 were classified as risk averse. Landowners who selected investment option 5 in
Table 5.2 were classified as risk neutral, while landowners who selected investment options 6
and 7 were classified as risk-takers. The upper and the lower limits of the coefficients of the
constant partial risk aversion for each distribution are reported in Table 5.2. To investigate the
changes in partial risk aversion for each landowner, we increased the level of investment by
factors of 4 and 10.
Table 5.1: Statements used to elicit the landowne rs’ risk preference
1.

I like taking financial risks

2.

I try to avoid investment risks

3.

I am willing to take financial risks in order to realize higher returns

4.

I prefer to receive a guaranteed return even if it is low

5.

It is unlikely that I would invest in a business if it has a chance of
failing

6. When making investment decisions I attach equal weight to
maximizing long-term returns and minimizing financial risks.
7.

I aim to achieve high long-term returns on my investments even if
that means taking significant financial risks in the short-run

8.

I prefer to receive a guaranteed low return on my investments
rather than an uncertain high return
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Table 5.2: An example of the basic structure of the investment method expe riment using
a $25,000 investment level

Investment
option

Lowest
net
return

Average
net return

Highest
net return

Partial risk aversion
interval

1

$2,500

$2,500

$2,500 +infinity to 7.47

2

$2,271

$2,600

$2,930 7.47 to 2

3

$1,989

$2,700

$3,412 2 to 0.85

4

$1,603

$2,800

$3,997 0.85 to 0.32

5

$962

$2,900

$4,838 0.32 to -0.32

6

$372

$2,800

$5,228 -0.32 to -0.45

7

$0

$2,700

$5,400 0.45 to -infinity

5.3 Descriptive Summary of Survey Results
5.3.1 Demographics
Table 5.3 presents a summary of the demographic variables collected from the
respondents. The vast majority of the respondents were male (93.15%) and Louisiana
residents (92%). The average age for the respondents was just under 62 years, with a range of
22 to 90 years old. The vast majority of the respondents were college graduates (57.53%),
with 15.07% of the respondents having some college education and the remaining 27.4% of
the respondents having no college education.
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Table 5.3: Demographic characteristics of the respondents
Variable

Percent (%)

Cumulative percent (%)

Education attainme nt
Some high school (or less)
Completed high school or GED
Trade or technical school graduate
Some college
College graduate

4.11
15.07
8.22
15.07
57.53

4.11
19.18
27.4
42.47
100

6.85
93.15

6.85
100

1.67
8.33
6.67
6.67
11.67
23.33
16.67
25

1.67
10
16.67
23.33
35
58.33
75
100

8.22
91.78

8.22
100

90.41
9.59

90.41
100

Gende r
Female
Male
Household total income
Under $15,000
$15,001 to $30,000
$30,001 to $50,000
$50,001 to $70,000
$70,001 to $100,000
$100,001 to $150,000
$150,001 to $200,000
Over $200,000
Residency
No Louisiana residence
Louisiana residence
Home location
Does not live on the property
Lives on the property

The income question was the most frequently skipped demographic question, with
only 60 out of the 75 respondents providing information about income level. As reported in
Table 5.3, 35% of the respondents had incomes of $100,000 or less, and 23% of the
respondents had incomes in the range of $100,001 to $150,000. In additions, 17% of
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respondents had incomes in the range of $150,001 to $200,000, and 25% of the respondents
reported annual incomes over $200,000, The majority of the landowners (90.41%) reported
that they did not live on the properties that were identified in the questionnaire.
5.3.2 Attitudes Toward Wetland Conservation and Various Incentive Programs
Landowners were asked to indicate the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with
various statements relating to wetland restoration. First, the landowners were asked, a general
question about the importance of wetland restoration to future generations. The majority of
the respondents (91%) either strongly agreed or agreed with this statement. Then the
landowners were asked more direct questions about the values of wetland restoration. In
response to the statement, “Restored wetlands protect wildlife and/or fish habitat,” 93% of the
respondents strongly agreed or agreed with this statement. Similarly, about 92% of the
respondents strongly agreed or agreed with the statement, “Restoring wetlands improves
water quality and reduces erosion.” Approximately 90% of the respondents strongly agreed or
agreed with the statement, “Wetland restoration provides storm and flood protection” (see
figure 5.3).
Asked about their awareness of various wetland restoration programs in the coastal
zone, 46% of the landowners indicated that they were aware of wetland restoration programs
in their area. Out of the group of respondents who were aware of wetland restoration
programs in their areas, 47% had enrolled in one or more of the available programs.
Landowners were also asked if they would be willing to participate in future programs, with
the majority of the respondents (86%) indicating that they were willing to participate.
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Wetlands values

Restoring wetlands provides storm
and flood protection
Restoring wetlands improves water
quality and reduces erosion
Restoring wetlands protects wildlife
and fish habitats
Restoring wetlands is important for
future generations
0%

Strongly Disagree

Disagree

Neutral

20%

40%

Agree

60%

80% 100%

Strongly Agree

Figure 5.3: Respondents’ attitudes concerning the importance of restoring wetlands in
coastal Louisiana
Following this question, the landowners who were interested in participation were asked to
indicate the importance of the following wetland restoration incentive instruments: 1) tax
incentive, 2) cost-sharing assistance, 3) direct grants and subsidies, 4) temporary conservation
easement, 5) permanent conservation easement, 6) wetland mitigation banking, and 7) carbon
credit program. They were asked to rate (on a 5-point Likert scale) the importance of each of
the incentive instruments (see Figure 5.4). The most preferred instrument was direct grants
and subsidies (83% of the respondents rated this option as either somewhat important or very
important). The second preferred instrument was cost sharing assistance, with 66% of the
respondents rating cost sharing as either somewhat important or very important. Tax
incentives were also popular, with about 59 % of the respondents indicating that this program
was either somewhat important or very important. Somewhat less popular were permanent
conservation easements and wetland mitigation banking, but a majority of the respondents
(52% and 51 %, respectively) rated these two instruments either somewhat important or very
important. Temporary easement and carbon credit instruments received considerably less
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support, with 35-36 % of the landowners indicating that these programs were somewhat to
very important.

Carbon credit program
Wetland mitigation banking

Permanent conservation easement
Temporary conservation easement
Direct grants and subsidies

Cost-sharing assistance
Tax incentive

0%

20%

40%

60%

Not important at all

Somewhat unimportant

No opinion

Somewhat important

80%

100%

Very important

Figure 5.4: Landowne rs’ preferences for various incentive instruments for wetland
restoration and maintenance in coastal Louisiana
5.3.3 Characteristics of the Properties
Landowners were asked a group of questions regarding the general characteristics of
their landholdings, including property size, percentage of wetland, current land use,
ownership type, the time that the property was first acquired, how is it managed, and how
much wetland had been loss, the percentage of household income generated from both surface
and sub-surface activities, and the expected market value of the property. A statistical
summary of the main variables in this section is presented in tables 5.4 and 5.5. The results
show that the properties of the landowners who responded to the survey have diverse
characteristics. The total acres owned by respondents ranged from 19 to 150,000 acres, with
an average of 5,249 acres and standard deviation of 17,892 acres. The average wetland
acreage on these properties was 2,764 acres, with a range of 16 to 25,175 acres. In percentage
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terms, wetlands averaged about 76% of the property acreage of the respondents, ranging from
5% to 100%.
Table 5.4: Statistical summary of the property characteristics for respondents to the
landowne r survey.
Variable
Mean
Std Dev
Min
Max
Total
Property size

5,249

17,892

19

150,000

Wetland percent

75.73

28.18

5

100

Wetland total acres

2,764

4,789

16.4

25,175

Leased(0,1) dummy
variable

0.43

0.50

0

1

Acres lost

329

1,176

0

800,7

17,417

1,653

4,047

0

25,000

82,635

Leased acres

393,680

193,450

Table 5.5: Owne rship structure and land management
Percent
(%)

Variable

Cumulative
percent (%)

Ownership type
Sole ownership

32

32

Joint ownership through a tenants- in- common
arrangement

20

52

Joint ownership through a corporation or trust

29.33

81.33

Other ownership

18.67

100

Self- managed

60.81

60.81

Managed using hired a service or employees

12.16

72.97

8.11

81.08

Management type

Managed by leaseholder
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The most common ownership structure among respondents was sole ownership (about
32 % of the properties). The second most common ownership structure was joint ownership
through a corporation or trust, with 29% of the respondents choosing this category. The third
most common ownership category was joint-ownership through a tenants- in common
arrangement, with about 20% of the wetland properties owned in this way. The remaining
19% of the property were owned through some other, generally unspecified structure.
A majority of the respondents (60.81%) indicated that they self- managed their
landholdings (see Table 5.5). The distribution of other management types included the
following: 19% of the respondents had their properties managed by government personnel,
12% of the properties were managed by a hired service or employees, and 8% of the
properties were not being actively managed.
Landowners were also asked in this section of the questionnaire about wetland loss on
their properties and whether they were renting out part of their properties to other landowners.
Although only 53 landowners (out of 75 respondents) provided estimates for wetland loss on
their properties, these losses averaged 329 acres (standard deviation of 1176 acres), or
approximately 14% of the total wetland acres held by the respondents to this question. When
the landowners were asked if they leased out part of their properties, only 43% of the
respondents indicated that they did, with the average lease size being 1,653 acres (standard
deviation of 4,047 acres for the 50 respondents to this question).
Landowners were asked to rate (on a 5-point scale) the importance of each of the
following land activities on the tract of land specified in their questionnaire: 1) agriculture
production, 2) timber production, 3) fur-trapping, alligator hunting and egg production, 4)
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waterfowl hunting, 5) fishing, and 6) oil and gas activities. The primary land use was
waterfowl hunting, with 57% of the respondents rating this land use option as either important
or very important. The second land use option was oil and gas activities, with about 53% of
the respondents rating this option as either important or very important. Fur-trapping, alligator
hunting and egg production was also a popular land use optio n, with 40% of the respondents
rating it as either somewhat important or very important. About 39% of the respondents rated
the fishing land use option as either important or very important. Agricultural activities and
timber production were not common in these coastal zone properties, with only 19% and 9%
of the respondents rating these options as either somewhat important or very important,
respectively. Finally, only 9% of the respondents indicated that they used their landholdings
for other types of activities. Figure 5.5 presents a frequency chart of the land use activities.

Oil & gas activities
All types of fishing

Waterfowl hunting
Fur trapping, alligator hunting, and/or egg
collection

Timber production
Agriculture production
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%100%
Not very important

Unimportant

No opinion

Important

Very important

Figure 5.5: Values assigned by the landowne rs to various land uses activities associated
with the current use of the property tract
Landowners were asked about the percentages of their annual incomes derived from
surface and subsurface activities on the specific tract of land noted in the questionnaire. The
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vast majorities of the respondents derived no income from surface (70%) or subsurface
activities (72%). For those respondents with income from surface and sub-surface activities,
the surface income averaged about 12% of their annual income, ranging from less than 1% to
100%. Similarly, subsurface income averaged about 17% of their annual income, ranging
from less than 1% to 88%.
5.3.4. Wetland Investments
Landowners were asked if they made any investment in wetland restoration and
maintenance on the property specified in the questionnaire, and how much they privately
invested over the last 10 years. Only 35% indicated that they had, with the average total
private expenditure over the 10 years period being $31,522 with an associated standard
deviation of $93,265 (Table 5.6). Following this question, the landowners who had
implemented wetland restoration projects were asked about the type of restoration practices
they used. As reported in Table 5.7, the most commonly used practice was the installation of
water control structures, with approximately 62% of the respondents using this me thod .. The
second most commonly used practice was vegetative plantings (54% of the respondents),
followed closely by sediment, dredge or spoil usage (about 50% of the respondents). Finally,
between 20% and 27% of the respondents reported using fresh water inputs, nutrient/sediment
traps, or some other wetland restoration practices.
The landowners who invested in wetland restoration projects were asked, using a 5point Likert scale, to indicate the importance of a set of factors related to their decisions to
invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. The most important factor to the respondents
was the desire to protect or enhance the ecological functions of their property (Figure 5.6).
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Approximately 96% of the respondents rated this factor as either important or very important
in their investment decision to. The desire to protect or enhance the property market value
was listed as an important or very important reason for investing by 82% of the respondents.
Table 5.6. Statistical summary of the continuous variables in the investment section
Variable
Investment level

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

$31,521.74

$93,265.21

0

$600,000

Invest(0.1)
dummy

0.35

0.48

0

1

Uncertainty

5.10

3.68

0

10

Risk attitude

4.90

2.46

1

10

Table 5.7. Type of wetland restoration practices that the respondents used
Restoration
practice is
used

Name of restoration practice

Restoration
practice is
not used

Water control structures (gates, weirs, etc.)

61.54%

38.46%

Vegetative plantings (trees or grasses)

53.85%

46.15%

Nutrient/sediment traps (brush fences, terraces, etc.)

20%

80%

Sediment, dredge or spoil usage

50%

50%

26.92%

73.08%

24%

76%

Increased fresh water inputs to the property
Others

The availability of restoration subsidies and the desire to protect or enhance the property‟s
revenue generation ability were listed as important factors by approximately 71% and 75% of
the respondents, respectively.
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Desire to protect or enhance the ecological functions
Recent improvements in restoration technology
Desire to protect or enhance the property’s revenue
generating ability
Desire to protect or enhance the property market
value
Availability of restoration subsidies in the form of
technical assistance
Availability of restoration subsidies in the form of
monetary payments
0%

Not very important

Unimportant

20%

No opinion

40%

Important

60%

80%

100%

Very important

Figure 5.6: Respondents’ perceptions about various factors that influence their
decisions to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance
Similarly, landowners were asked about the factors that have prevented them, or might
prevent them in the future, from investing in wetland restoration (Figure 5.7). Potential
respondents were given a list of factors and asked to indicate the importance to each factor
using a 5-point Likert scale. Topping the list of these deterrent factors was the high cost of
wetland restoration, with 75% of the respondents listing this factor as either important or very
important in their decisions not to invest. The second most important factor was insufficient
government financial incentives, with about 69% of the respondents rating this factor as
important or very important. Uncertainty about future benefits and costs of wetland
restoration and the lack of personal financial resources were also important, with about 66%
of the respondents ranking these factors as either important or very important. Fifty two
percent of the respondents listed the lack of personal economic benefits from wetland
restoration as an important or very important impediment to investing. At the bottom of the
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list of investment impediments was the lack of need for wetland restoration, with only 22% of
the respondents reporting this factor as an important deterrent to investment.

Lacks of personal economic benefits from
restorations
Lack of personal financial resources for
restorations
No need for wetland restoration
Insufficient government financial incentives
Uncertainty about future costs and benefits
of restoration
High current cost of restoration
0%
Not very important

Unimportant

20%

No opinion

40%

60%

Important

80%

100%

Very important

Figure 5.7. Respondents’ perceptions about various factors that influence their
decisions not to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance
Given the reported importance of uncertainty about future cost and benefits in the
investment decision-making process, the landowners were also asked to identify the sources
of uncertainty they were facing. Potential respondents were given a selected set of uncertainty
sources and were asked to rank them (Figure 5.8). Uncertainty about changing government
policies was ranked the number one source of uncertainty, with 50% of the respondents
indicating it to be the most important source of uncertainty and 19% of them ranking it
second most important source. Another important source of uncertainty, as perceived by the
landowners, was shifting environmental conditions, with 58% of the respondents ranking this
as either the first or second most important source of uncertainty. Uncertainty about
restoration costs and restoration technologies were ranked third and fourth, respectively.
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Others
Shifting environmental conditions

Changing restoration costs
Availability of effective restoration
technology
Changing government policies
0%

20%

40%

1st preference

2nd preference

4th preference

5th preference

60%

80%

100%

3rd preference

Figure 5.8. Respondents’ perceptions about uncertainty sources
Finally, landowners were asked to assess the level of uncertainty associated with
making a positive return on investment in wetland restoration and maintenance projects using
a 0 to 10 scale, with 0 representing no uncertainty and 10 high uncertainty. On average, the
respondents assessed the level of uncertainty to be right in the middle of the range (Table 5.6),
with the average score being 5.10 (standard deviation equal to 3.68).
5.3.5 Landowner Risk Preferences
In total, 72 landowners responded to the self-ranking risk question. The responses of
the respondents ranged from 1 to 10, with a mean of 4.9 ( Table 5.6). The self ranking risk
question did not allow for classifying respondents into risk averse and risk taker groups
because it did not provide a unique measure of the risk preferences of the respondents (such
as the coefficients of the partial risk aversion in the investment method). However, the
distribution of the respondents scores reported in Figure 5.9 was used to shed light on how
landowners assessed their risk preferences compared to other landowners. For example,
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Figure 5.9 shows that 43% of the respondents reported that they avoided taking investment
risk compared to a respondent with a score of 5 (the median score). In addition, 38% of the
respondents reported that they were willing to take more investment risk than a respondent
with a score of 5.

25

Respondents (%)

20
15
10
5
0

1
Risk
Hating

2

3

4

5
Median

6

7

8

10
Risk
Loving

Figure 5.9. Landowners’risk attitude scores based on the self ranking question
Principal component analysis 6 of the multi- item scale approach revealed three important
factors that explained about 72% of the total variation in the sample (Table 5.8). The first
factor had an eigenvalue of 14.66 and explained about 34.11% of the total variation in the
sample, and the second factor had an eigenvalue of 10.31 and explained 24% of the total
sample variation. The third factor had an eigenvalue of 5.97 and explained about 14% of the
total variation in the sample. Three items (4, 5, and 8) out of the total 8 items reported in
Table 5.1 make up the first factor. Since two of these items are related to the return risk, then
the first factor appeared to measure the landowners‟ attitudes toward risk in returns. The
6

Item# 6 in Table1 was excluded fro m the principal co mponent analysis due to a small and insignificant loading
coefficient.
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Table 5.8. Variance matrix of the principal component analysis

Factor

Eigenvalue
(variance)

Cumulative
variance
explained(%)

Variance
explained (%)

Factor 1

14.66

34.11%

34.11%

Factor 2

10.31

23.99%

58.10%

Factor 3

5.97

13.89%

71.99%

Factor 4

5.25

12.21%

84.21%

Factor 5

3.51

8.18%

92.38%

Factor 6

1.88

4.37%

96.76%

Factor 7

1.39

3.24%

100%

second factor was represented by two items (1 and 3), and both of them are related to
financial risk. Hence, the second factor appeared to be measuring the landowners‟ attitudes
toward the financial risk. Finally, item 2 had significant loadings on the eigenvector of the
third factor. The third factor appeared to measure the importance of investment risk (see table
5.9).
The multi- item risk method did not allow for classifying landowners into risk averse,
risk neutral, or risk taker groups. However, principal component analysis can be used to
calculate the scores of landowners associated with each factor, with these factor scores
subsequently used to assess a respondents level of risk preference. Before running the
analysis, all items presented in Table 5.9 were rescaled to take on values of -4 (”I strongly
disagree”) to 4 (”I strongly agree”), with items with negative scores indicating that
landowners avoided taking risk and items with positive scores indicating that landowners
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were willing to take risk. Consequently, respondents with positive factor scores would
indicate that they were less willing to take risk than respondents with zero factor scores and
respondents with negative factor scores would indicate that they were willing to take more
risk than respondents with zero factor scores. As reported in Table 5.10, results of the first
factor model showed that 43% of respondents indicated they tend to take less risk than
respondents with zero factor scores. However, about 40% of the respondents indicated that
they were willing to take more risk than respondents with zero factor scores. Results of the
other factor models are presented in Table 5.10.
Table 5.9. Factor loading matrix of the principal component analysis
Item

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

I like taking financial risks

0.285

0.597

0.077

I try to avoid investment risks

0.326

-0.369

0.777

I am willing to take financial risks in order to
realize higher returns

0.212

0.598

0.038

I prefer to receive a guaranteed return even if it is
low

0.535

-0.155

-0.047

It is unlikely that I would invest in a business if it
has a chance of failing

0.482

-0.185

-0.459

I aim to achieve high long-term returns on my
investments even if that means taking significant
financial risks in the short-run

0.232

0.264

0.331

I prefer to receive a guaranteed low return on my
investments rather than an uncertain high return

0.442

-0.148

-0.257

Note: factors‟ loadings that are larger than 0.4 are presented in bold. Only the results of the
first three factors are reported in this table.
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Finally, the distribution of the respondents‟ answers for the investment method
question associated with a $25,000 investment level7 is reported in Table 5.11. In total, only
52 landowners answered this question. The results showed that the vast majority of the
respondents (73%) were classified as risk averse. About 21 % of the landowners were
classified as risk neutral, and only 6% of the landowners were classified as risk takers.
Table 5.10. Landowne rs’ risk attitudes based on the multi-ite m scale approach
Factor

Avoid taking risk

Risk indifferent

Like taking risk

Factor 1

43.28%

16.42%

40.30%

Factor 2

38.81%

23.88%

37.31%

Factor 3

37.31%

29.85%

32.84%

Table 5.11. Landowners’ investment distribution choices associated with a $25,000
investment level
Investment option

Percent (%)

Cumulative percent (%)

1

17.31%

17.31%

2

9.62%

26.92%

3

17.31%

44.23%

4

28.85%

73.08%

5

21.15%

94.23%

6

3.85%

98.08%

7

1.92%

100%

7

Due to large number of missing observations associated with the question regarding the other two investment
levels ($100,000 and $250,000), the results of the risk investment question for a $25,000 investment level is
discussed.
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Taken together, the survey data collected in this study indicated that the majority of
landowners were risk averse. About 73% of the respondents were classified as risk averse
based on the investment method. The other risk preference elicitation methods did not allow
for specific categorizations of the landowners into risk averse and risk taker groups, but they
showed that a large number of respondents appeared to avoid taking risk in their investment
decisions. A large proportion of landowners placed importance on wetland conservation, with
more than 90% of the landowners either strongly agreeing or agreeing with statements related
to the importance of wetlands for 1) future generations, 2) wildlife and/or fish habitats, 3)
water quality and erosion control, and 4) storm and flood protections. The survey results also
provided important information regarding attitudes toward incentive programs for wetland
restoration and maintenance. The majority of landowners (86%) indicated that they would be
willing to participate in wetland restoration programs. About 83% of these landowners
selected direct grants and subsidies as their most preferred incentive instrument. Cost sharing
assistance and tax incentives were the second and third most preferable incentive options,
respectively.
The primary land uses for respondents to the survey were waterfowl hunting and oil
and gas activities. Timber and agricultural production were the least important land-use
activities in the sample. The vast majority of landowners (70% or more) derived no income
values from their wetland holdings. With regard to investments in wetland restoration and
maintenance projects, only 35% of the landowners had made any wetland restoration
investments. Costs of wetland restoration, insufficient financial incentives, and uncertainty
about future benefits and costs of wetland restoration projects were considered major
deterrents to investment. With regard to the uncertainty sources, the majority of the
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landowners listed uncertainty about changing government policies, and shifting
environmental conditions as their chief concerns. The next chapter uses this information, and
more, to estimate the empirical models outlined in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 6
RESULTS OF EMPIRICAL ESTIMATION
Two econometric models to analyze landowner investment decisions were presented
in chapter 4 – the Tobit model and the double hurdle model. The Tobit model assumes that
landowners make the decisions to invest and the level of investment simultaneously, while the
double hurdle model assumes that landowners make these decisions sequentially. To explore
the implications of choosing each of these decision making models, this chapter presents
empirical results from the estimation of the Tobit and the double hurdle models, comparing
the results and testing to see which model best represents the survey data. The material is
presented in the chapter as follows. First, a brief summary of the key variables used in the
analysis is presented, followed by the results of the Tobit model estimation. Next, the results
of the double hurdle model estimation are presented and discussed. Lastly, the two
econometric models are compared for their suitability given the collected data.
6.1 Data Summary
Descriptive statistics of the variables selected for the analysis are reported in Table
6.1. Considering the dependent variables, “invest” is a discrete dummy variable that indicates
if the landowners made any wetland investment on their property and “invest level” describes
the level of private investments that were made over the last 10 years. The descriptive
statistics show that majority of landowners did not invest in wetland restoration and
maintenance with only 35% of the respondents indicating that they had done so. But, for those
who did make private investments, the average total investment over the last 10 years was
$31,522 (standard deviation of $93,265).
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Table 6.1: Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis

Variable

Description

Mean

Std. Dev

Invest

=1 if investing in wetland restoration, 0 otherwise

0.35

0.48

Invest
level

Total investment expenditure on wetland restoration($)

31,522

93,265

Wetac

Total wetland acres owned or managed

2,764

4,789

Age

Landowner's age, in years

61.94

12.4

Educ

Landowner's level of education

4.07

1.28

Landinc

Total household income related to the property use ($)

8,922

26,828

Sowner

=1 of the landowner is a sole-owner, 0 otherwise

0.32

0.47

=1 if the landowner is enrolled in government wetland
Govwetrp restoration programs, 0 otherwise

0.22

0.41

Pubinv

=1 if public investment is made on the property, 0 otherwise

0.12

0.33

Consatt

An index for the landowners attitudes toward wetland
conservation

4.69

0.7

Riskatt

A self reported measure of risk attitude

4.9

2.46

Agruse

=1 if part of the property is used for agricultural production,
0 otherwise

0.19

0.39

LAresid

=1 if the landowner is Louisiana residence, 0 otherwise

0.92

0.28

Distshore

Distance from the shore line(miles)

28.6

17.11

Long

Longitude(miles)

144.87

88.98
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6.1.1 Characteristics of Landholdings
A relevant explanatory variable in the decision to invest in wetland restoration and
maintenance is the property size, represented here by the total wetland acreages owned or
operated. Property size was previously found to have a positive effect on investment in soil
conservation (Norris and Batie, 1987; Soule et al., 2000). It was expected that the larger the
wetland size, the larger the level of investment in wetland restoration projects. This variable
was transformed via natural logarithm to allow for a nonlinear relationship between wetland
investments and wetland property size.
Land income (“landinc”) was defined as the total household income level 8 derived
from the activities that took place on the respondent‟s wetland property. This variable was
created by multiplying the percentage of income derived from the both surface and subsurface activities with the mid-value of the income range that the respondents reported. A
positive relationship between income and the decision to invest was reported in other studies
(Norris and Batie, 1987; Romm et al., 1987; Zhang and Flick, 2001). It was expected that
landowners with higher incomes from their wetland properties would invest more in wetland
restoration and maintenance projects.
Two property location variables were included in the analysis. The first location
variable was the distance of the property (in miles) from the shoreline (Distshore). The
distance of the property from the shoreline was calculated by overla ying the digitalized
property information with the existing GIS map of coastal Louisiana. The distance of the

8

Out of the total sample (N=75), 60 respondents reported their inco me earn ings. An auxiliary regression was
used to impute the missing data. Income was specified as a function of wetland acres (in natural logarith m) and
education. The regression R-square was 0.41 and all explanatory variab les were h ighly significant. The predicted
incomes fro m this au xiliary regression were used for the missing observations. The result of this auxiliary
regression is presented in Appendix B. Due to missing observations of the explanatory variables in the auxiliary
regression model, only 11 out of total 15 inco me missing observations were generated.
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property from the shoreline was calculated by drawing a straight line between the property
center and the nearest point on the coastal map, and measuring its length. This variable was
included in the model as a proxy for the vulnerability of the wetland property to erosion and
other exogenous, weather related forces. It also captured the impact of wetland type on the
landowners‟ investment decision. Properties that are located close to the shoreline are
generally dominated by salt marshes, and properties located further from the shoreline are
dominated by fresh marshes. It was expected that landowners with wetland properties further
inland are more likely to invest, and invest more, in wetland restoration projects. The second
location variable was the longitude of the property (Long). This variable was included as a
proxy for wetland losses. Historical wetland loss rates and projected losses are concentrated in
the eastern part of the State, and then mainly in the lower Terrebo nne, Barataria basins and
Mississippi basins (Louisiana Department of Natural Resources (LADNR), 1999). As such,
the high rate of wetland loss in the eastern part of the state may make investment infeasible
and increases investment risk. Therefore, landowners with properties located in the eastern
part of the state would be less likely to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance projects.
Alternatively, one might argue that the higher the rate of wetland loss in the eastern part of the
state may encourage landowners to invest in wetland restoration projects in order to prevent
additional wetland losses. Thus, the expected sign of this variable is ambiguous. The Long
variable was measured in miles and it increases as the property location moves from wes t to
east.
The use of the property for agricultural production was also hypothesized to influence
the decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. To capture this effect, a
dummy variable for agriculture land use (Agruse) was included in the analysis. Agruse was

83

assigned a value of 1 if a landowner used part of his/her landholding for agriculture
production and 0 otherwise. It was hypothesized that landowners who use part of their
properties for agricultural activities were less likely to invest in, wetland restoration projects
than other landowners due to diminishing surface and subsurface wetland incomes, time
constraints, and changes in operational focus.
6.1.2 Characteristics of the Landowne rs
Characteristics of the landowners included both demographic variables and attitudes
toward risk and wetland conservation issues. The demographic variables included age,
education, and residence, and ownership structure. Age was expected to be negatively
associated with the dependent variables. Education was expected to have positive impact on
the dependent variables. It was hypothesized that landowners who are sole owners and reside
in Louisiana have higher chances to invest and invest more in wetland restoration projects.
An index for the landowners‟ attitudes toward wetland restoration (Consatt) was
constructed by averaging the responses of the landowners to four statements regarding the
importance of wetland conservation for: 1) future generation, 2) wildlife and fish hab itats, 3)
water quality and erosion control, and 4) storm and flood protection. All responses were
elicited using a Likert scale (1= strongly disagree, 2=disagree, 3= neutral, 4=agree, and
5=strongly agree). It was hypothesized that the higher the score of the Consatt variable, the
higher the likelihood and the level of wetland investments. A landowner‟s attitudes toward
risk were elicited using the self-ranking risk question. They were given a 1 to 10 scale (1
being risk hating, and 10 being risk loving) and asked to rate their risk preferences. Risk
attitude was expected to have a negative relationship with the decision to invest in wetland
restoration and maintenance projects.
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6.1.3 Influence of Government Programs
Participation in government wetland restoration programs (Govwetrp) is expected to
influence a landowner‟s decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance projects.
The Govwetrp variable is measured as a dichotomous variable, indicating whether a
landowner is a participant in any wetland restoration programs. It was hypothesized that
landowners who were enrolled in government-sponsored wetland restoration programs would
be more likely to invest, and invest more, in wetland restoration and maintenance projects.
Hence, the expected sign of the Govwetrp variable is positive.
The decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance projects was also
expected to be influenced by the level of public investment (Pubinv) made on the property.
Pubinv is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a landowner received cost sharing assistance or
direct subsidies to conduct wetland restoration projects, and 0 otherwise. The expected sign of
this variable is an empirical question.
6.2 Results of the Tobit Model
All parameter estimates and marginal effects of the Tobit model were generated using Stata
version 11 (StataCorp, 2009). The parameter estimates for the Tobit model and their
associate standard errors are reported in Table 6.2. The standard errors associated with the
parameter estimates of the Tobit model were made robust to some kinds of error
misspecification, including non- normality and hetroskedasticity, 9 using the subroutine “Vce
(robust)” in Stata (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The marginal effects for the variables that
are used in the model, and their associated standard errors, are presented in Table 6.3. Two
9

Tests for both non-normality and heteroskedasticity were conducted using the regression version of the
Lagrange Multip lier (L test outlined in Wooldridge (2002) page 534. The result of the LM test failed to reject the
null hypothesis of homoskedasticity (LM test of 0.427 with a p -value equal to 0.808). However, the LM test
rejected the null hypothesis that the error terms are normally distributed. The value of the LM statistic is 43.803,
and it has a p-value that less than 0.001.
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types of marginal effects are reported . The conditional average marginal effects are the
partial effects averaged across the sample observations and obtained using the “margeff”
command in Stata. The conditional marginal effects at the means are the partial effects
estimated at the sample means of explanatory variables and obtained using the “mfx”
command in Stata (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009). The two marginal effects can have
significantly different values in nonlinear models. In addition, the average marginal effects
are preferable for nonlinear models and models and in the case of discrete variables
(Wooldridge, 2002, Papke and Wooldridge, 2008). Unless otherwise stated, therefore, the
conditional marginal effects we refer to in the discussion section are the conditional average
marginal effects. Overall, the Tobit model fit the data well, with an overall model likelihood
ratio statistic of 30.77 (significant at 1% level).
The results in Table 6.2 reveal that property size is an important factor explaining a
landowner‟s investment decisions. The coefficient of the variable representing wetland
property size (Lnwetac) is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, indicating that
the larger the wetland property size, the higher the probability of investment and level of
investment in wetland restoration and maintenance. The conditional marginal effect 10 reported
in Table 6.2 suggests that a 1% increase in wetland property size will increase private
investment by approximately $299 for those landowners who had already decided to invest.
This result is consistent with the finding of other studies. Norris and Batie (1987) found a
positive relationship between farm size and the soil conservation expenditures, while Soule et
al. (2000) found farm size to be positively related to the adoption of conservation practices.

10

The unconditional marginal effect s and the probability marginal effects were excluded fro m Table 6.3 for
simp licity reasons and the absence of statistically significant marginal effects .
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Dhakal et al. (2008) found that property size was positively related to the probability of
investing in a forestry plantation.
Table 6.2. Parameter estimates of the Tobit model
Variable

Coefficient

Robust standard e rror

Constant

-2214273*

1097693

Lnwetac

29918.81**

14152.73

Riskatt

11767.48

13237.41

Sowner

154632***

55871.96

Govwetrp

160479.8

116596.9

Pubinv

-91670.31

111136.6

Landinc

-0.93

2.04

Agruse

-211311.2*

119070.9

Long

-894.36*

471.51

Distshore

6444.99*

3377.71

Consatt

383296.2*

216603.3

Age

431.1981

2868.953

Educ

6474.37

20378.67

-163196.9

114810.9

LAresid
Log-Likelihood

-222.05

Likelihood ratio statistics

30.77

Prob>chi-square

0.0036

Sample size

58

***,**,* denotes that the corresponding parameters are significant at 1%,5% and 10%
respectively
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Table 6.3. Marginal effects for the Tobit model
Conditional marginal
Conditional marginal effect
effect
(evaluated at the mean level)
29919**
3903**
(14153)
(1952)
Riskatt
11767
1535
(13237)
(1762)
Sowner
154632***
22994**
(55872)
(8928)
Govwetrp
160480
26680
(116597)
(21084)
Pubinv
-91670
-10483
(111137)
(10839)
Landinc
-0.93
-0.12
(2.04)
(0.27)
Agruse
-211311*
-22067**
(119071)
(10486)
Long
-894.36*
-116.67**
(471.51)
(51.47)
Distshore
6444.99*
840.76**
(3377.71)
(371)
Consatt
383296*
50001**
(216603)
(13483)
Age
431.20
56.25
(2868.95)
(371.64)
Educ
6474
845
(20379)
(2792)
LAresid
-163197
-29321
(114811)
(22927)
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses ***,**,* denotes that the corresponding parameters
are significant at 1%,5% and 10% respectively,
Variable
Lnwetac

Other Tobit results indicate that ownership structure plays an important role in the
investment decision. The coefficient of ownership dummy variable (Sowner) is positive and
highly significant at the 1% level. As expected, landowners who were sole-owners were more
likely to invest, and invest more, in wetland restoration and maintenance projects. Conditional
on investing in wetland restoration and maintenance, landowners with a sole ownership
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structure invested $154,632 more than other landowners. Ownership structure was previously
found to be an important factor influencing the decisions to invest in soil conservation (Soule
et al. (2000); Featherstone and Goodwin (1993); Norris and Batie (1987)), invest in forest
improvement (Dhakal et al. (2008)), and participate in government forestry assistance
programs (Nagubadi et al. 1996 ).

The estimated coefficient for Agruse dummy variable was negative and significant at
the 10% level, suggesting that landowners who use part of their properties for agricultural
production are less likely to invest, and make smaller investments if they do, in wetland
restoration projects. This negative correlation between agricultura l land use and the decision
to invest was expected for several reasons. First, the survey data showed that the majority of
landowners (more than 70%) derived no income values from their wetland properties. Hence,
the presence of wetlands on agricultural production properties might impose extra costs on the
landowners with farming activities because landowners cannot use these wetland areas for
agricultural production purposes. Gelso et al.(2008) investigated the costs associated with the
presence of wetland areas in cropland for Kansas producers. They found that the presence of
wetlands imposed inconvenience costs on producers, especially the more dispersed these
wetlands. Second, one can argue that investment in wetland restoration is not very appealing
for landowners engaged in agricultural activities for reasons such as time constraints,
competition for private capital between agriculture and wetlands operations, and changes in
operational focus. Royer (1987) investigated the reforestation behavior of so uthern private
landowners and found a negative relationship between farming and reforestation investments.
The conditional marginal effect shows that landowners who had invested in wetland
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restoration projects and used their properties for agricultural production invested $211,311
less on wetland restoration and maintenance than other landowners.
The coefficient of the longitude variable (Long) was negative and statistically significant at
10% level in the Tobit model. Thus, landowners with wetland properties in the eastern part of
the state were less likely to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance than landowners in
the western part of the state. This negative and significant correlation between the longitude
of the property and the decision to invest was not unexpected. First, the majority of wetland
losses in coastal Louisiana are concentrated in the eastern part of the State. Second, the vast
majorities of these wetlands are relatively unproductive (from an ecological perspective) salt
marshes, at least compared to the coastal freshwater marshes in the western part of the state.
This combination of high wetlands losses and relatively low productivity makes investments
in properties located in the eastern part of the state less attractive to private landowners. The
conditional marginal effect of the Long variable shows that investment in wetland restoration
and maintenance decreased by $894 as the property location moved 1 mile west to east.
The distance of the property from the shore line (Distshore) had positive and
significant coefficient at the 10% level, indicating that the probability of investment and the
level of investment increases in relation to distance from the coast. This positive relationship
between Distshore variable and investment was expected for several reasons. First, it is
generally true that the further a tract is from the coastal boundary between land and open sea,
the less vulnerable it is to the damaging effects of hurricane wind, storm water surges, and
other weather related factors. This, in return, lowers the risk associated with the decision to
invest in restoration projects and may increase the likelihood of investing in such projects.
Second, freshwater marshes tend to dominate the wetland properties that are furthest from the
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coastal boundary, and the expected return on an investment in freshwater wetlands is
generally higher than for salt marshes. As reported in Table 6.3, the conditional marginal
effect shows that the level of investment increased by $6,445 a s the distance of the property
from the shore line increased by 1 mile (evaluated at the mean distance of 28.6 miles, the
conditional marginal effect was equal to $841 ).
Attitudes toward wetland restoration and maintenance were found to be important
factors in the investment decision. The coefficient of the variable that captured the
landowner‟s attitudes toward wetland conservation (Consatt) was positive and statistically
significant at the 10% level, indicating that landowners who sympathize with wetland
conservation objectives were more likely to invest, and invest more, in coastal wetland
restoration projects. Conditional on investing, an additional unit increase in the conservation
attitude index (Consatt) increased the level of investment by approximately $383,296.
Langpap (2004) found conservation attitudes to be an important factor in private landowners‟
decisions to participate in incentives programs for habitat protection of endangered species.
However, Ervin and Ervin (1982) did not find statistical evidence that conservation attitudes
influenced the decision to invest in soil conservation.
Unexpectedly, the coefficient of the risk attitude variable (Riskatt) was not statistically
significant given that. survey results indicated that landowners considered uncertainty an
important impediment factor in their investment decisions. About 66 % of the respondents
rated uncertainty about future benefits and costs of wetland restoration as either an important
or very important impediment factor. The insignificant effect of risk aversion may be
attributed to the failure of the Tobit model to treat the decision about whether to invest and the
decision about how much to invest separately. The role of risk aversion in the two decision
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processes is still an empirical question in the literature. Saha et al. (1994) demonstrated that
that risk aversion played an important role only in the level of adoption decision but not the
decision to adopt. However, Koundouri et al. (2006) showed that risk aversion played an
important role in the decision to adopt irrigation technology. In addition, another surprising
result of the Tobit model was that none of the typical explanatory variables were statistically
significant in the decision process, including age, land income (Landinc), education (educ),
residency (LAresid), participation in government wetland restoration program (Govwetrp),
and public investment(Pubinv)
6.3 Results of the Double Hurdle Model
The double hurdle model was estimated using Stata version 11 (StataCorp, 2009).
Given that in most cases theory does not give clear guidance concerning allocation of
explanatory variables between the first and second hurdles, an ad hoc method for selecting
variables for each hurdle is used (Carroll et al, 2005). Specifically, the allocation of
explanatory variables in the two hurdle equations was explored through a lengthy selection
procedure that involved an iterative series of estimations. First, a preliminary probit model
was estimated using all potential explanatory variables. Then, a preliminary Tobit model was
estimated using all potential explanatory variables. Only explanatory variables that were
statistically significant at the 10% level (or greater) in either a probit model or a Tobit model
were selected to start the estimation of the double hurdle model. Initially, all of these
significant variables were included in both the first and second hurdle equations, but
statistically insignificant variables were gradually removed from the model. In some ways,
this procedure sought to mimic reverse stepwise regression, both to focus on the variables that
had the most explanatory power and to conserve degrees of freedom in the estimations.
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The maximum likelihood parameter estimates for the double hurdle model and the
marginal effects for the variables were obtained using the Craggit command in Stata
(described in Burke (2009). The parameter estimates and the associated standard errors are
reported in Table 6.4, with marginal effects for the variables that are used in the model and
their associated standard errors presented in Table 6.5. The marginal effects referred to here
are the partial effects averaged across the sample observation. The standard errors for the
marginal effects were calculated using the delta method and the nlcom command in Stata. The
standard errors associated with the parameter estimates of the double hurdle model were made
robust to some kinds of error misspecification, including non-normality and
heteroskedasticity, 11 using the command Vce (robust) in Stata(Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).

As in the Tobit model, the estimated coefficient of the Longitude variable (Long) is
negative and statistically significant at the 1% level of significance. Thus, wetland restoration
and maintenance investments by private landowners were more likely to occur as one moves
in a westerly direction. In other words, landowners facing high wetland losses (east) are less
likely to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance, perhaps due to the risk of investment
failure and the higher cost of restoration activities in areas where wetland loss is rapidly
occurring. The probability marginal effect of the Long variable is statistically significant at
1%. It shows that the probability of investment in wetland restoration and maintenance will
decrease by 0.2% as the property location moves west to east by 1 mile. The unconditional
marginal effect of Long variable, which is positive and significant at the 1% level, indicates
11

Similarly to the Tobit model case, we test for both non-normality and heteroskedasticity of the error term in
the second hurdle equation us ing the regression version of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test (Wooldridge,
2002). The result of the LM test failed to reject the null hypothesis that the error terms are ho moskedastic (value
of the LM test is 1.09 with a p-value equal to 0.58). Ho wever, the LM test rejected the null hypothesis that the
error terms are normally d istributed (value of the LM statistic is 19.1 with a p -value less than 0.001).
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that expected investment in wetland restoration and maintenance decreases by $271 as the
property location moves 1 miles to the east.
Table 6.4. Parameter estimates of the double hurdle model
Variable

Coefficient

Robust
standard e rror

First hurdle equation
Constant
-13.744**
5.712
Sowner
1.113**
0.535
Agruse
-1.990**
0.844
Govwetrp
1.457***
0.556
Consatt
2.656**
1.146
Long
-0.008***
0.003
Distshore
0.029*
0.016
Second hurdle equation
Constant
-1358299***
273779
Lnwetac
81295***
16212
Riskatt
69165***
16048
Sowner
400376***
99277
Govwetrp
298995***
56834
Pubinv
-510153***
73807
Landinc
27.920***
9.901
Educ
46987
32953
Sigma
59335***
14248
Log- likelihood
-205.4
Sample size
59
***,**,* denotes that the corresponding parameters are significant at 1%,5% and 10%
respectively

Similarly, the estimated coefficient of the variable Distshore is positive and
statistically significant at 10% level in the first hurdle equation, indicating that the greater the
distance of the property from the shoreline, the higher the probability of investment in
wetland restoration and maintenance projects. As discussed earlier, the further a tract is from
the coastal boundary, the less vulnerable it is to the damaging effects of hurricane wind, storm
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water surges, and other weather related factors. This, in turn, lowers the risk associated with
the decision to invest and may increase the likelihood of investing in such projects.
Furthermore, tracts that are located close to the shore line are generally dominated by salt
marshes and they are less productive than tracts located further from the shore, which are
dominated by fresh marshes, perhaps making them less attractive as investment candidates.
The marginal effect of this variable is positive and significant at the 1% level. It shows that
the probability of investment increases by 0.6% as the property‟s distance from the shore
increases by 1 mile. The unconditional marginal effect shows that investment in wetland
restoration and maintenance will increase by $1,067 as the property distance from the shore
increases by 1 mile.
Past studies have found ownership structure to be a significant influence on the
decision to invest in soil conservation (Soule et al., 2000); Featherstone and Goodwin, 1993;
Norris and Batie, 1987), forestry improvements ( Dhakal et al.,2008), and decisions to
participate in government forestry assistance programs (Nagubadi et al., 1996 ). In this study,
the impact of the ownership structure was captured using a dummy variable (Sowner) that
was equal one if the landowner was a sole-owner and 0 otherwise. The estimated coefficient
of this variable was positive and significant at the 5% level in the first hurdle, implying that
landowners who are sole-owners are more likely to invest in wetland restoration and
maintenance than other landowners. The marginal effect of this variable indicates that soleowners are 23% more likely to invest privately in wetland restoration and maintenance. In
addition, the coefficient of Sowner is positive and significant at the 1% level in the second
hurdle equation, implying that landowners who are sole-owners are not only more likely to
invest, but they also invest more than owners with other types of ownership structures. The
95

unconditional marginal effect indicates that sole-owners privately invest $103,405 more in
wetland restoration and maintenance activities than other landowners. Conditional on the
investment decision, sole-owners are found to invest $155,356 more in wetland restoration
and maintenance than other landowners.
Table 6.5. Marginal Effects for the Double Hurdle Model

Variable
Lnwetac

Probability

Riskatt
Sowner
Agruse
Govwetrp
Consatt
Long
Distshore
Pubinv
Landinc
Educ

0.228
n/a
-0.290
n/a
0.332
n/a
0.545***
(0.1374)
-0.0015***
(0.00034)
0.006***
(0.00194)

Conditional
Investment
25094***
(5708.48)
21350***
(5651.14)
155356
n/a

125968
n/a

-121865
n/a
8.620**
(3.359)
14504
(10998.5)

Unconditional
Investment
9454***
(345.21)
8043***
(341.74)
103405
n/a
-63139
n/a
136470
n/a
96528***
(7172)
-271.28***
(18.24)
1067.4***
(84.4)
-61375
n/a
3.25***
(0.203)
5464***
(665.11)

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses
***,**,* denotes that the corresponding parameters are significant at 1%,5% and 10%
respectively,

The estimated coefficient for landowner attitudes toward wetland restoration and
maintenance (Consatt) was positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in the first
hurdle equation, indicating that landowners who value wetland restoration issues are more
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likely to invest in coastal wetland restoration. The marginal impact of this variable suggests
that a 1 unit increase in the conservation attitude index increases the probability of investment
by 55% and increases the expected level of investment by approximately $96,528. Langpap
(2004) found conservation attitudes to be an important factor in private landowner decisions
to participate in incentives programs. Gelso et al. (2008) also found that farmer attitudes
toward conservation and environmental regulation have a significant impact on the perceived
costs associated with the presence of wetland areas on their farmlands. However, Ervin and
Ervin (1982) found no statistical evidence that conservation attitudes influence the decision to
invest in soil conservation.
The double hurdle estimation shows that landowners who are using part of their
properties for agricultural activities are less likely to invest in wetland restoration projects,
with the coefficient of the dummy variable (Agruse) being negative and significant at the 5%
level in the first hurdle equation. As discussed with respect to the Tobit model, this negative
relationship between the use of a land tract for agricultural production and the probability of
wetland investment is not surprising. Several factors can explain this negative correlation,
including the lack of farming income from wetland areas, competition for private capital
between agriculture production and wetland restoration, and the costs involved in changing
operational focus. The results of this study are similar to the findings of Royer (1987), where
engagement in farming activities was negatively related to reforestation investment. The
marginal effect value of this variable implies that landowners who are using their properties
for agricultural production have, on average, a 29% smaller chances o f investing in wetland
restoration and maintenance than other landowners, ceteris paribus. The unconditional
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marginal effect shows that landowners who use part of their landholdings for agriculture
production invest $63,139 less on wetland restoration and maintenance than other landowners.
In contrast to the Tobit model results, participation in government-sponsored wetland
restoration programs (Govwetrp) had a positive effect on the probability of investment and the
level of investment in the double hurdle model, with the estimated coefficient of Govwetrp
being positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in both hurdles. This result supports
the hypothesis that government wetland restoration programs have stimulated at least some
private wetland investment in coastal Louisiana. The marginal effect indicates that
landowners enrolled in wetland restoration programs have a 33% higher probability of
investing in wetland restoration and maintenance. The unconditional marginal effect shows
that landowners who were enrolled in wetland restoration programs invested $136,470 more,
on average, than other landowners. Conditional on having made the decision to invest,
landowners who are enrolled in wetland restoration programs invest $125,968 more than other
landowners. These results are similar to those found in other studies. For example, Hagos
and Holden (2006) studied the influence of public programs on the household‟s investment in
soil conservation in northern Ethiopia, and found that participation in public programs
stimulated investment in soil conservation. In another instance, Featherstone and Goodwin
(1993) used a Tobit model and found that participation in government programs had a
positive effect on farmer decisions to invest in soil conservation.
The estimated coefficient of the public investment dummy variable (Pubinv) was
negative and highly significant in the second hurdle equation, indicating that receiving public
financial assistance results in lower private investment, thus signaling a substitution
relationship between public and private capital. The marginal effects show that landowners
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who use public investments to conduct wetland restoration and maintenance activities invest
$61,375 less than landowners who did not receive public investments. Conditional on
investing, landowners who use public investment invest $121,865 less on wetland restoration
and maintenance than other private landowners. This result is similar to Zhang and Flick
(2001), who found that forest landowners receiving cost sharing subsidies invested less of
their own capital in forest replanting. These authors also concluded that there was a
substitution effect between public funds and private capital.
Risk attitude was found to play an important role in the level of private investment
made by the landowner. The coefficient of this variable (Riskatt) was positive and statistically
significant at the 1% level, implying that the more risk averse the landowners, the lower the
investments will be in wetland restoration and maintenance. Both the conditional and
unconditional marginal effects for the risk attitude variable were statistically significant at the
5% level (see Table 6.5). The unconditional marginal effect indicates that a 1 unit increase in
the risk attitude score (in other words, becoming less risk averse) leads to a n $8,043 increase
in the level of private investment. The conditional marginal effect of this variable shows that a
1 unit increase in the risk attitude score leads to $21,350 increase in the level of investments
for the landowners who have already made the investment decision. Figure 6.1 presents the
predicted wetland investments for various levels of risk aversion, holding all other variables
constant at their means. The predicted wetland investment ranges from $1,703 for a highly
risk averse landowner to $46,573 for a highly risk taking landowner. Therefore, risk aversion
decreases the expected level of wetland investment. This negative relationship between risk
aversion and investment has been documented in other studies that examined similar decision
making problems (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Shapiro, 1992; Hagos and Holden, 2006; Benitez el
99

al., 2006; Goldstein et al., 2006; Stordal et al., 2007; Abadi Ghadim et al., 2005; Isik and
Khanna, 2003).
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Figure 6.1 Predicted wetland investments associated with various levels of risk attitudes.
The coefficient of the wetland property size (lnwetac) was positive and statistically
significant in determining the level of investment (the second hurdle equation), indicating that
larger wetland properties generally experience higher levels of investment. Furthermore, the
coefficient of the wetland property size variable in the Tobit model was approximately 64%
lower than the estimated coefficient of wetland size in the double hurdle model. This
divergence between the two models exemplifies the degree of bias that can arise when an
intrinsically two-stage decision process is modeled as a single process. The conditional
marginal effect of wetland size suggests that a 1% increase in property size will lead to a $250
increase in the level of investment in restoration and maintenance, while the conditional
marginal effect for the Tobit model shows that a 1% increase in size increases the level of
investment by $299 (or approximately 20% more than the corresponding conditional
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marginal effect reported for the double hurdle model). As a comparison, the literature reported
mixed results regarding the relationship between investment and the property size. Some
studies found that property size had significant positive effects on investment decisions
(Norris and Batie, 1987; Soule et al., 2000); Dhakal et al., 2008). Other studies, however,
found no significant relationship between property size and investment decisions ( Ervin and
Ervin, 1982; Featherstone and Goodwin, 1993; Romm et at., 1987; Hagos and Holden, 2006;
Zhang and Flick, 2001). The result of double hurdle estimation in this study, however, clearly
indicates that property size has positive effects on the investment decisions for private
landowners.
The coefficient of the land income variable (Landinc) was positive and statistically
significant in the second hurdle equation, indicating that landowner income plays an
important role in determining the level of private investment in wetland restoration and
maintenance, with more productive properties (in terms of income) receiving higher levels of
private investment. This positive relationship between income and investment was reported in
a number of other studies (Norris and Batie, 1987; Romm et al., 1987; Zhang and Flick,
2001), but Featherstone and Goodwin (1993) did not find a relationship between total farm
income and soil conservation investments. The marginal effects reported in Table 6.5 show
that a $1 increase in income from wetland-based activities resulted in a $3.25 increase in the
level of investment for all landowners, and a $8.62 increase for those landowners who had
already made previous investments.
Finally, the estimated coefficient of the education variable (educ) was positive but
statistically insignificant. The unconditional marginal effect was significant and shows that a
move from one education category to the next highest category would lead to a $5,464
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increase in the level of investment. For example, a respondent who has completed college will
invest $5,464 more in wetland restoration projects if he/ she has some college education (but
never completed it). On the other hand, the conditional marginal effect was larger in
magnitude, but not statistically significant. Previous studies have found education to be a
significantly positive influence on the level of investment in technology adoption (Saha et al.,
1994) and soil conservation (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Norris and Batie, 1987; Hagos and
Holden, 2006).
One way of interpreting the estimated double hurdle model is by categorizing
landowners into two groups. The first group, landowners who do not cross the first hurdle
equation, may never invest in wetland restoration and maintenance under any circumstances.
The second group, landowners who pass the first hurdle, are potential investors. This second
group has two choices: a) invest in wetland restoration and maintenance (positive value of the
dependent variable) or b) do not invest in wetland restoration and maintenance (zero value of
the dependent variable). Therefore, the estimated double hurdle model can be used to predict
the probability that an individual landowner would fall in one of the two categories.
Consequently, looking at the common characteristics of the landowners in each category may
be of interest when it comes to discussing the policy implications of landowner behavior. The
probability that a landowner will not invest in wetland restoration and maintenance can be
expressed as follows:
(50)
where

is a vector of the estimated parameters of the variables that are included in the first

hurdle equation. Equation (50) was estimated for all the landowners who did not invest in
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wetland restoration and maintenance at the time the survey was taken. The predictive results
(see Figure 6.2) show that most landowners have a high probability of never investing in
wetland restoration projects. More specifically, the histogram shows that 85% of the
landowners who did not invest in wetland restoration projects at the time of the survey have
probabilities in excess of 0.5 that they will never invest in wetland restoration projects. The
results also show that, on average, the probability that a landowner in this group would never
invest in wetland restoration and maintenance was 0.81.

Figure 6.2: Histogram of predicted probability of no investment in wetland restoration
and maintenance
Similarly, we can use the double hurdle model to look at probability distributions for
landowners who are potential investors. The probability that a landowner will invest in
wetland restoration and maintenance is:
(50)
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where

is the vector of the estimated parameters of the variables that are included in the first

hurdle equation. Equation (50) was estimated for all landowners in the sample who reported
investing in wetland restoration projects at the time of the survey, and a frequency histogram
of the results is presented in Figure 6.3. The results indicate that only 46% of the landowners
who are potential investors have probabilities of investment higher than 50%. Put another
way, the majority of the landowners in the group of potential investors have probabilities of
investment lower than 50% based on the estimated double hurdle coefficients.

Figure 6.3: Histogram of predicted probability of investment in wetland restoration and
maintenance
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6.4 Model Selection
The results of the Tobit and double hurdle models presented in the previous sections
show that both models adequately represented the collected data. However, comparisons of
the two models suggest that the double hurdle model might better explain the data (compared
to the Tobit model) due to a larger number of significant parameters. This hypothesis can be
tested by: a) estimating a Tobit model with only the variables found in the second hurdle of
the double hurdle model (the result of this restricted Tobit model is presented in Appendix C )
using a likelihood ratio test for the null hypothesis that the univariate Tobit is superior to the
double hurdle model. The resulting likelihood ratio statistic was 2(229.5-205.4)=48.2 with a
chi-square distribution and 7 degrees of freedom. This result indicates that the Tobit model
specification can be rejected in favor of the double hurdle model specification at the 5% level
of significance, or that landowners make private wetland restoration and maintenance
investment decisions in a sequential manner by first deciding whether to invest and then
deciding how much to invest.
While the Likelihood ratio (LR) test shows that the double hurdle model outperforms
the Tobit model, the double hurdle model is preferable to the Tobit model for other reasons,
too. For example, several variables, including risk attitude (Riskatt), are not statistically
significant in the Tobit model, but they are significant in the double hurdle model. In part,
this leads to the double hurdle model‟s better explanatory power.
Existing literature suggests that risk attitude plays an important role in investment
decisions (Ervin and Ervin, 1982; Shapiro, 1992; Hagos and Holden, 2006; Benitez el al.,
2006; Goldstein et al., 2006; Stordal et al., 2007; Abadi Ghadim et al., 2005; Isik and
Khanna, 2003; Saha et al., 1994; Koundouri et al., 2006). The majority of these studies found
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a negative relationship between risk aversion and the level of investment. Results of the
double hurdle estimation are in line with these findings. The result of the Tobit model,
however, did not show that risk aversion significantly influenced the landowner‟s investment
decision.
Previous findings on the role of income on investment decisions are inconsistent.
Some studies found income to be an important factor in the investment decision (Norris and
Batie, 1987; Zhang and Flick, 2001; Romm et al., 1987), while others studies did not
(Featherstone and Goodwin, 1993). The result of the double hurdle model suggests that
income significantly influences the level of investment decision. This result is in line with the
results of most previous studies, and lends support to the double hurdle model as the best fit to
the data. On the other hand, the results of the Tobit model do not show that income affects
investment decisions of the landowners.
Participation in government programs has been found to influence the farmers‟
decisions to invest in soil conservation (Featherstone and Goodwin, 1993) and reforestation
investment ( Zhang and Flick, 2001 ). Two variables were used to capture the participation
decisions of the landowners in this study – Govwetrp and Pubinv. The coefficients of these
two variables are statistically significant in the double hurdle model, but not in the Tobit
model. This is additional evidence that the double hurdle model outperforms that Tobit model,
which in return emphasizes the importance of the first hurdle in the decision process.
It was hypothesized that the more positive the attitudes toward we tland restoration
issues, the more likely that landowners would invest in wetland restoration and maintenance.
This hypothesis is supported by both the estimated double hurdle model and the Tobit model.
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The coefficient of the Consatt variable is positive and significant at 1% and 10% levels of
significance respectively. The result of the double hurdle model shows that landowners‟
attitudes toward wetland restoration influence only the landowners‟ decisions about whether
to invest but not the level of investment. This is the reason for including this variable only in
the first hurdle equation. Our findings are in line with the results of the study by Langpap
(2004).
In summary, the double hurdle model statistically outperformed the Tobit model, was a
better explainer of the collected data, and conformed to the majority of findings in related
research areas. The next, and final, chapter uses the results from the double hurdle model in
support of a discussion examining the implications of the modeling for efforts to promote the
use of private investment in coastal wetland restoration and maintenance.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Encouraging private wetland landowners to invest in wetland restoration and
maintenance activities can be a challenging task. First, any decision to invest in restoration
and maintenance is subject to a high level of uncertainty associated with climate change,
changes in wetland regulatory policy, and changes in restoration technologies, Second, the
majority of the benefits associated with wetland restoration and maintenance activities are
enjoyed by the public rather than private landowners themselves, thereby presenting, at least
partly, a public goods barrier to individual action. This dissertation developed a theoretical
model of the landowner ‟s decision making process in the face of uncertainty and relatively
high wetland restoration costs. The conditions under which landowners would invest were
derived under assumptions of risk aversion and relatively high fixed and variable costs. The
validity of the theoretical model was tested using survey responses from 75 private wetland
landowners in coastal Louisiana. Two econometric models (Tobit and double hurdle) were
estimated to determine the importance of various factors, including risk aversion, on the
probability and the level of private coastal wetland investments.
The results of the survey data showed that the vast majority of landowners considered
the costs of wetland restoration and the uncertainty surrounding future benefits and costs of
wetland restoration projects as the major factors deterring wetland restoration in coastal
Louisiana. The survey respondents considered changing government policies and shifting
environmental conditions as major sources of uncertainty. Overall, the majority of landowners
were found to be risk averse, an observation that partly explains the respondent‟s focus on
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uncertainty and highlights the fact that uncertainty and restoration costs play important roles
in the decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance activities.
The Likelihood Ratio (LR) test was employed to test the null hypothesis that the Tobit
was superior to the double hurdle model. The result of the LR test indicates that the Tobit
model specification can be rejected in favor of the double hurdle model specification, thus
suggesting that landowners make their investment decisions in a sequential, two-step process.
First, landowners decide whether to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance, and
second, they decide on how much to invest. The double hurdle model conformed closely to
both the theoretical expectations and previous empirical research concerning the importance
of various factors in the decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. For
example, several variables, including risk attitudes of the landowners and land income were
not statistically significant in the Tobit model, but they were highly significant in the double
hurdle model.
The role of risk in landowner decisions was shown to arise from at least two sources:
the varying risk attitudes among landowners and the physical risk factors associated with the
location of the wetland property. More specifically, risk aversion decreased the expected level
of restoration and maintenance, and the physical risk factors associated with the location of
the wetland property, and high restoration costs, decreased the likelihood of investment.
These relationships are evident in the geographic dispersion of investments, where
landowners who own/manage properties that are located in the eastern part of the state and
located close to the shore line (highly vulnerable areas) being less likely to invest in wetland
restoration and maintenance projects than other landowners.
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Wetland property size was also an important factor that helped determine whether a
landowner would invest in wetland restoration and maintenance. Landowners wit h larger
wetland properties invested more in wetland restoration and maintenance activities than other
landowners. The results also indicated that landowners who used at least part of their
properties for agriculture production were less likely to invest in restoration projects. A
couple of reasons can be proposed for this finding, including the potential for lost farm
incomes due to wetlands – either because of direct resource-use competition or competition
for scarce fixed and variable cost capital – or the diversion of managerial focus from
production to preservation. The results also show that landowners who are sole-owners are
not only more likely to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance, but they also invest
more in these projects. Landowner‟s attitudes toward wetland conservation had a positive
influence on the decisions to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance, with positive
attitudes toward wetland conservation increasing the probability of investment.
Participation in government-sponsored wetland restoration programs was a very
important determinant of a landowner‟s investment decisions. Landowners who participate in
government-sponsored wetland restoration programs have higher probabilities of privately
investing in wetland restoration and they make larger investments than other landowners. At
the same time, private investment expenditures in wetland restoration projects are lower for
landowners receiving public financial assistance, which suggests a substitution effect between
public and private capital.
Finally, the results of the double hurdle model showed that income is also important
determinants of a landowner‟s decision to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance.
Total household income derived from activities on the wetland property had a positive
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influence on the investment decision, with higher income households having higher levels of
investment. Education also had a positive effect on the landowner‟s decision regarding the
level of wetland investment but it was statistically insignificant at 10% level of significance,.
The result of this modeling effort also highlighted the difference between the marginal
effects obtained by averaging the partial effects across the sample (average marginal effects)
and the marginal effects obtained at the sample means. In general, average marginal effects
for the Tobit model were approximately 7 to 8 times more than the marginal effects computed
at the sample mean. This result raises a serious question about which marginal effect should
be used in an analysis. For example, if the average marginal effects across the sample are the
correct ones, then using the marginal effects at the sample means can seriously underestimate
the effects of the explanatory variables and lead to erroneous conclusions. The opposite is true
if the marginal effects at the sample mean are the correct ones. While the literature contains
only limited discussions of this topic, and is still inconclusive about which type of marginal
effects should be used, several authors have advocated the use of average marginal effects for
nonlinear models and models with discrete variables (Greene 2003,Wooldridge 2002, Papke
and Wooldridge 2008, Bartus 2005). Therefore, only the average marginal effects for the
double hurdle model were reported, and all the discussions of the model results were done in
terms of the average marginal effects.
Once estimated, the double hurdle model was used to predict the probability of zero
future investments in wetland restoration and maintenance projects for all landowners in the
sample who did not undertake any wetland restoration projects. The results indicate that 85%
of the landowners who did not invest in wetland restoration projects at the time of the survey
have probabilities in excess of 0.5 that they will never invest in wetland restoration projects.
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This finding supports the anecdotal evidence that the vast majorities of landowners are not
only not planning to invest in wetland restoration and maintenance, but that the idea of doing
so does not even occur to them.
The results presented in this dissertation have potentially important implications for
the design of policy instruments to encourage private wetland restoration efforts in coastal
Louisiana. First, policies need to consider the effects of risk aversion, and uncertainty on a
landowner‟s decisions to invest in wetland restoration projects. Failure to do so will not only
lead to overestimating the participation rates in a program, but it will also lead to
underestimating the size of the needed incentive payments for participation and the expected
costs of the policy instruments. Therefore, incorporating the effects of risk aversion, and
uncertainty into the benefit-cost analysis of the proposed policy may provide more realistic
assessment of how a wetland restoration policy will perform in the future.
Another result with strong policy implications concerns the current and future role of
publically- funded restoration programs. Landowners who participate in governmentsponsored wetland restoration programs are more likely to invest in wetland restoration and
maintenance and make more private investments than landowners who have no experience
with the government programs. This suggests that the existing programs in the coastal zone
such as Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA), and Coastal Wetland
Reserve Program (CWRP) have been effective in introducing restoration technology to
landowners and in encouraging them to take a more active role in the stewardship of their
land. Coupled with the result that a landowner‟s attitudes toward wetland conservation have a
positive influence on the probability of investing, an argument can be made in favor of
expanded education programs concerning the benefits of wetland conservation and restoration
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activities. At the same time, however, there was a distinct public- for-private capital
substitution effect when examining landowners who received some form of financial
assistance in conducting restoration projects. While this substitution effect is not surprising, it
does imply that the size of, and rules governing, financial assistance programs needs to be
closely considered so that they do not have the perverse effect of reducing overall private
investment.
The results of the modeling effort clearly showed a competitive relationship between
agricultural production and wetland restoration. While policies similar to the Wetland
Reserve Program – which provides financial and technical support for landowners to protect
and restore wetland areas on their properties – would be one way to reduce this competition,
other avenues need to be explored to increase the revenue generating capability of wetlands,
particularly those in agricultural areas. In fact, because the total amount of household income
derived from activities on the wetland property was found to have positive influence o n the
level wetland investment, one could expect wetland owners to welcome that enhance the
income generation capability of wetland properties. For example, under the North American
Wetlands Conservation Act (NAWCA), landowners can receive financial support to
undertake waterfowl habitat improvement projects. The survey data shows that waterfowl
hunting was the primary land use among the survey respondents. Therefore, the expansion of
programs such as NAWCA should provide additional incentives for private restoration
activities in the coastal zone.
Variations in wetland investments across the characteristics of the landowners and
their landholdings have policy implications with regard to the design and implementation of
wetland restoration programs that seek to encourage private actions. For example, results of
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the double hurdle model suggests that any program will be more effective if it targets
landowners who are more educated, own large wetland properties, are sole-ownership
organized, are not engaged in agricultural production, and have properties that are located
inland and in the western part of state. Such a policy, if correctly structured and implemented,
could lead to high participation rates and significant private investments. For example, we
used the parameter estimates of the double hurdle model to estimate the total amount of
private investment that has been expended by all landowners in the analysis. We find that the
estimated total level of investment for all 59 landowners over the last ten years is
approximately $2,629,991. On average, each landowner invests about $44,576 in wetland
restoration and maintenance activities over the last ten years. Extrapolating that level of
investment to all landowners in the sample frame, the expected level of private investment in
wetland restoration and maintenance is $7,481,258 for the ten year period.
In the absence of targeted wetland restoration programs, wetland investments might
not occur in coastal areas where wetland restoration projects are thought to be needed the
most (i.e., areas with high wetland loss rate). If the objective of the wetland policy is to
maximize investments in high-risk areas, then publicly- funded projects may be a better
approach. Alternatively, it may be possible to design a program, or separate programs, that
would address the unique characteristics of the wetland restoration problems on the opposite
sides of the state.
Given the magnitude and scope of the problem in coastal Louisiana, the best strategies
for addressing wetland loss should include cooperation between all interested parties,
jncluding private landowners, local communities and their citizens, and government officials.
Private landowners control the vast majority of wetlands in the coastal zone, but they have
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very limited private capital and their investment decisions have limited effects in the absence
of existing large scale public restoration projects. Similarly, there are limited public funds to
completely address the issue of wetland loss in Louisiana‟s coastal zone, and the majority of
public restoration projects will either affect or be implemented on private properties. As a
result, the cooperation of private landowners, and the coordination of their private investment
decisions with public restoration projects, are necessary for any successful wetland restoration
effort. Wetland restoration programs can be more effective if they target the participation of
private landowners in areas that are actively being addressed by public restoration projects.
Furthermore, these wetland restoration programs will be most effective if they are designed to
encourage greater coordination of investment decisions of adjacent landowners and
landowners in close geographic areas.
.

115

REFERENCES

Abadi Ghadim, A.K., D.J. Panell., and M.P. Burton. 2005. Risk, uncertainty, and learning in
adoption of a crop innovation. Agricultural Economics 33:1-9.
Alig, R.J. 1986. Econometric analysis of the factors influencing forestry acreage trends in the
Southeast. Forestry Science, 32(1):119-134.
Amemiya, T. 1984. “Tobit models: A survey.” Journal of Econometrics 24: 3-61.
Antle, J.M. 1983. Incorporating risk in production analysis. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 65:1099–1106
Arabmazer, A., and P. Schmidt. 1982.An investigation into the robustness of the Tobit
estimator to nonnormality. Econometrica 50:1055-1063
Arabmazer, A., and P. Schmidt. 1981.Further evidence on the robustness of the Tobit
estimator to hetroskedasticity. Journal of Econometrics 17:253-258
Arrow, K.J. and A.C. Fisher. 1974. Environmental preservation, uncertainty, and
irreversibility.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 88:312-319.
Arrow, K.J. 1971. Essays in the theory of risk bearing. Chicago: Markham Publishing.
Bard, S.K., and P.J. Barry. 2001.Assessing farmers‟ attitudes toward risk using „closin-In‟
Methods. Journal of agricultural and resource Economics 26:248-260.
Baron, R. A., and Byrne, D. (1981). Social psychology: Understanding human interaction
(3rd ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon.
Barras, J.A., Bernier, J.C., and Morton, R.A., 2008, Land area change in coastal Louisiana--A
multidecadal perspective (from 1956 to 2006): U.S. Geological Survey Scientific
Investigations Map 3019, scale 1:250,000, 14 p. pamphlet
Bartus, T. 2005. Estimation of marginal effects using margeff. The Stata Journal 5(3):309329
Benitez, P. C., T. Kuosmanen., R. O lschewski., and G.C. Van Kooten. 2006. Conservation
payments under risk: A stochastic dominance approach. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 88:1-15.
Blundell, R., and C. Meghir. 1987. Bivariate alternatives to the univariate Tobit model.
Journal of Econometrics 34:179-200.

116

Boesch, D.F., M.N. Josselyn, A.J. Mehta, J.T. Morris, W.K. Nuttle, C.A. Simenstad, and
D.J.P. Swift. 1994. Scientific assessment of coastal wetland loss, restoration and management
in Louisiana. Journal of Coastal Research 20:1-103
Burke, W.J. 2009. Fitting and interpreting Cragg‟s Tobit alternative using Stata. The Stata
Journal 9(4):584-592
Bulte, E., D.P.Van Soest., G.C. Van Kooten., and R. A. Schipper. 2002. Forest conservation
in Costa Rica when nonuse benefits are uncertain but rising. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 84(1):150–160.
Caffey, R.H. and M. Shexnayder. 2003. Coastal Louisiana and south Florida: A comparative
wetland inventory. Draft Fact Sheet. Louisiana State University.
Caffey, R.H. 2005. Why is Louisiana losing its coastal wetlands and how much have been
lost? Louisiana sea grant hurricane resources recovery website, FAQ,
Capozza, D.R. and Y. Li. 1994. The intensity and timing of investment: the case of land.
American Economic Review 84(4):889-904.
Cameron, A.C., and P.K. Trivedi.2009. Microeconometrics using Stata. College Station, TX:
Stata Press.
Capozza, D.R. and G.A. Sick. 1994. The Risk structure of land markets. Journal of Urban
Economics 35:297-319.
Capozza, D.R. and R. Helsley. 1990. The Stochastic city. Journal of Urban Economics
28:187-203
Capozza, D.R. and Y. Li. 1994. “The intensity and timing of investment: The Case of Land.”
American Economic Review 84(4):889-904.
Capozza, D.R. and G.A. Sick. 1994. The Risk structure of land markets. Journal of Urban
Economics 35:297-319.
Cardona, H. 1999. Analysis of policy alternatives in implementation of coastal nonpoint
pollution control program for agriculture, PhD Thesis, Department of Agricultural Economics
and Agribusiness, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
Carey.J M; and D. Zilberman.2002. A model of investment under uncertainty : Modern
Irrigation technology and emerging markets in water. American Journal of agricultural
economics 84: 171-183
Carroll, J., S.McCarthy., and C. Newman.2005. An econometric analysis of charitable
donations in the republic of Ireland. The Economic and Social Review 36(3):229-249.

117

Churchill, G.A. 1995.Marketing research: methodological foundations. Chicago: The Dryde n
Press.
Coastal Wetlands Planning, Protection and Restoration Act (CWPPRA ). 2006. A response to
Louisiana‟s land loss.
Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority( CPRA). 2007. Fiscal year 2008 annual plan:
ecosystem restoration and hurricane protection in coastal Louisiana.
Cragg, J.G. 1971. Some statistical models for limited dependent variables with application to
the demand for durable goods. Econometrica 39(5): 829-844
Dhakal, B., H. Bigsby.,and R. Cullen. 2008. Determinants of forestry investment and extent of
forestry expansion by smallholders in New Zealand. Review of Applied Economics 4:65-76.
Day, J. W., Jr., J. Barras., E. Clairain, J. Johnston, D. Justic, G. P. Kemp, J.-Y. Ko, R. Lane,
W. J. Mitsch,G. Steyer, P. Templet, and A. Yañez-Arancibia. 2005. Implications of global
climatic change and energy cost and availability for the restoration of the Mississippi delta.
Ecological Engineering 24:253-265.
Dillman, D. 1978. Mail and telephone surveys: The total design method. New York: John
Wiley and Sons.
Dixit, A.K. and R.S. Pindyck. 1994. Investment under uncertainty. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Epstein,L.G.1980. Decision making and the temporal resolution of uncertainty. International
Economic Review 21(2):269-283.
Ervin, C A. and D. E. Ervin. 1982. Factors affecting the use of soil conservation practices:
hypotheses, evidence and policy. Land Economics 58(3):277-292
Fausti, S and J. Gillespie. 2006. Measuring risk attitude of agricultural producers using a mail
survey : how consistent are the methods. The Australian journal of agricultural and resource
economics, 50:171-188.
Featherstone, A.M. and B.K. Goodwin. 1993. Factors influencing a farmer ‟s decision to
Invest in long-term conservation improvements. Land Economics 69(1):67-81.
Feder,G., R.E. Just., and D. Zilberman.1985. Adoption of agricultural innovation in
developing countries: A survey. Economic Development and Cultural Change 33:255-298.
Fisher, A. C., and W.M. Hanemann. 1990. “Option value: theory and measurement”,
European. Review of Agricultural Economics 7(2): 167-180

118

Fisher, A.C., J.V. Krutilla and C.J. Cicchetti. 1972. The economics of environmental
preservation: A theoretical and empirical analysis. American Economic Review 62:605-619.
Galloway, G., D. Boesch, and R. R. Twilley. 2009. Restoring and protecting coastal
Louisiana. Issues in Science and Technology, Winter 2009:29–38.
Gelso, B.R., J.A. Fox.,and J.M. Peterson. 2008. Farmers‟ perceived costs of wetland: effects
of wetland size, hydration, and dispersion. American Journal of Agricultural Economics
90(1):172-185.
Geltner, D., T. Riddiough, and S. Stojanovic. 1996. Insights on the effect of land use choice:
The perpetual option on the best of two underlying assets. Journal of Urban Economics
39:20–50.
Goldstein , J.H . G.C Daily. J. B. Friday. P.A, Matson.R. L, Naylor. and P,Vitousek. (2006).
Business strategies for conservation on private lands: Koa forestry as a case study.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103: 10140-45.
Goodwin, B.K., and T.C. Schroeder.1994. Human capital, producer education programs, and
the adoption of forward pricing methods. American Journal of Agricultural Economics
76:936-947
Greene, W.H. 2003. Econometric analysis. 5 th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall
Gunjal,K., and B. Legault. 1994. Risk preferences of dairy and hog producers in Quebec.
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 43: 23-36.
Jenson, H.H., and S. T. Yen. 1996. Food expenditures away from home by type of meal.
Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 44:67-80.
Hagos,F. and S. Holden. 2006. Tenure security, resource poverty, public programs and
household plot level conservation investments in the highlands of north Ethiopia. Agricultural
Economics 34:183-196
Heimlich, R.E., K.D. Weibe., R. Claassen., D. Gadsy.,and R.M. House. 1998. Wetlands and
agriculture: Private interests and public benefits. Resource Economics Division, E.R.S.,
USDA, agricultural economic report 765.10.
Henderson,J.E. 2007. Liability, institutions, and determinants of landowner access policies for
fee-based recreation on private lands. Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Agricultural
Economics and Agribusiness, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge.
Henry, C. 1974. Investment decisions under uncertainty: The irreversibility effect, The
American Economic Review, 64(6):1006-1012.

119

Hurd, M. 1979. Estimation in truncated samples when there is hetroskedasticity. Journal of
Econometrics 11:247-258
Isik, M., and W. Yang. 2004. An analysis of the effects of uncertainty and irreversibility on
farmer participation in the conservation reserve program. Journal of Agricultural and
Resource Economics 29(2):242-259
IsiK, M. and, M . Khanna.(2003) Stochastic technology, risk preferences and adoption of sitespecific technologies. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 85:305-317.
Isik, M., M. Khanna, and A. Winter-Nelson. 2001. Sequential investment in site-specific crop
management under output price uncertainty.Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
26: 212–29.
Jones, D., C. Cocklin and M. Cutting. 1995. Institutional and landowner perspectives on
wetland management in New Zealand. Journal of Environmental Management 45:143-161.
Koundouri, P., C. Nauges., and V. Tzouvelekas.2006. Technology adoption under production
uncertainty: theory and application to irrigation technology. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 88(3):657-670.
Kim, K., and J.P. Chavas. 2003. Technological change and risk management: An application
to the economics of corn production. Agricultural Economics 29:125-42.
Kline, J.,R.J. Alig., and R.L. Johnson. 2000. Fostering the production of non-timber services
among forest owners with heterogeneous objectives. Forest Science 46:302-311.
Knapp, K.C., and L.J. Olson.1996. Dynamic resource management: intertemporal substitution
and risk aversion. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 78:1004–1014.
Layva, J.C., J.A. Franco Martinez., and M.C. Gonzalez Roa. 2007. Analysis of the adoption of
soil conservation practices in olive groves: the case of mountainous areas in southern Spain.
Spanish Journal of Agricultural Research 5(3):249-258.
LaDNR.1999. Coast 2050: Toward a sustainable coastal louisiana, Louisiana Coastal
Wetlands Conservation and Restoration Task Force, La Dept. of Natural Resources. Baton
Rouge, LA.
Lipton, D.W., K. Wellman., I.C. Sheifer., and R .F. Weiher. 1995.Economic evaluation of
natural resources: A handbook for coastal resource policymakers.NOAA coastal ocean
program decision analysis series No. 5. NOAA coastal ocean office, Silver Spring, MD.
Maddala,G.,and F. Nelson. 1975. Specification errors in limited dependent variable models.
Working paper 96, National Bureau of Economic Research. Cambridge, Mass.

120

McDonald, J.F., and R.A. Moffitt.1980. The uses of Tobit analysis. Review of Economics and
Statistics 62:318-321.
Moffatt, PG.2005. Hurdle models of loan default. Journal of Operation Research Society
56:1063-1071.
Nagubadi,V. K.T. McNamara.,W. L. Hoover., and W.L. Mills, Jr. 1996. Programs participation
behavior of nonindustrial forest landowners: A probit model. Journal of Agricultural and
Applied Economics 28(2):323-336
Norris, P. E., and S. S. Batie. 1987. Virginia farmers‟ soil conservation decisions: An
application of Tobit analysis. Southern Journal of Agricultural Economics 19(1):79-90.
Penning, M.E., and P. Garcia. 2001. Measuring producers‟ risk preference: a global riskattitude construct. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 83(4):993-1009
Papke,L.E., and J.M. Wooldridge. 2008. Panel data methods for fractional response variables
with an application to test pass rates. Journal of econometrics 145:121-133
Parks, P. J., and Kramer.1995. A policy simulation of wetlands reserve program. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management 28:223-240
Parks, P. 1993. Explaining Irrational land use: Risk aversion a nd marginal agricultural land.
Journal of environmental economics and management 28:34-47
Paulsen,S. 2007. Investment in wetlands for pollution abatement under uncertainty. PhD
Dissertation. Department of Economics, Swedish University of Agricultural Sc iences (SLU),
Uppsala.
Plantinga. A.J., R.N. Lubowski., and R.N. Stavins. 2002. Effects of potential land
development on agricultural land prices. Journal of Urban Economics 52:561-581
Pratt, J. 1964. Risk aversion in the small and in the large. Econometrica 32: 122-136.
Purvis, A., W.G. Boggess, C.B. Moss, and J. Holt. 1995. Technology adoption decisions
under irreversibility and uncertainty: An ex ante approach.” American Journal
of Agricultural Economics 77:541–551.
Quigg, L.1993. Empirical testing of real option-pricing models. Journal of Finance
48(2):621-640.
Romm, J., R. Tuazon.,C. Whashburn. 1987. Relating forestry investment to the characteristics
of nonindustrial private forestland owners in northern California. Forest Science 331:197-209
Royer, J.P. 1987. Determinants of reforestation behavior among southern landowners. Forest
Science 33(3):654-667
121

Ryan, M., and C.D. Susman. 2003. Wetlands conservation in Louisiana: Voluntary incentives
and other alternatives, Journal of Environmental Law and Litigation 17: 441-495.
Saha, A., H.A. Love and R. Schwart. 1994. Adoption of emerging technologies under output
uncertainty. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 76:836-846.
Schatzki, T. 2003. Options, uncertainty and sunk costs: an empirical analysis of the land use
change. Journal of Environmental economics and management 46:86-105.
Schurle, B., and Tierney, W.I. 1990. A comparison of risk preference measurements with
implications for extension programming, staff paper no. 91-6. Department of Agricultural
Economics, Kansas State University, Monhattan.
Soderqvist, T. 2003. Are farmers prosocial? determinants of willingness to participate in
Swedish catchment-based wetland creation program. Ecological Economics 47:105-120.
Soule, M., A. Tegene and K.D. Wiere. 2000. Land tenure and the adoption of conservation
practices. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 82(4):993-1005.
Straka,T.J., H.W. Wisdom.,and J.E. Moak. 1984. Size of forest holding and investment
behavior of non- industrial private owners. The Journal of Forestry 82(8):495-496.
Stordal, G. L,. J.B. Hardaker., and L.J. Asheim. 2007. Risk aversion and optimal forest
replanting : A stochastic efficiency Study. European journal of Operational Research
181:1584-92.
StataCorp. 2009. Stata Statistical Software: Release 11. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.
Su, S-J. B., and S. T. Yen. 1996. Microeconometric models of infrequency purchased goods:
An application to household pork consumption. Empirical. Economics 21: 513-533.
Tengene, A,. K.Wiebe., and B. Kuhn. 1999. Irreversible investment under uncertainty :
conservation easements and option to develop agricultural land. Journal of Agricultural
Economics 50:203-219.
Thomas, A.C. 1987. Risk attitudes measured by the interval approach: a case study of Kansas
Farmers . American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 69:1101-1105.
Tobin,J.1958. Estimation of relationships for limited dependent variables. Econometrica
26(1):24-36.
Torkamani, J., and S. Shajari. 2008. Adoption of new irrigation technology under production
risk. Water Resources Management 22:229-237.

122

Winter-Nelson, A., and K. Amegbeto. 1998. Option values to construction and agricultural
price policy: application to terrace construction in Kenya. American Journal of Agricultural
Economics 80:409–418.
Wiemers, E. and Behan, J. 2004. Farm forestry investment in Ireland under uncertainty. The
Economic and Social Review 35:305-320.
Wooldridge, J.M. 2002. Econometric analysis of cross section and panel data. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Zhang, D., and W.A.Flick.2001. Sticks, carrots, and reforestation investment. Land
Economics 77(3):444-455
Zhao, J. and D. Zilberman. 1999. Irreversibility and restoration in natural resource
development. Oxford Economic Papers 51(July):559-573.

123

APPENDIX-A
WETLAND INVESTMENT SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Encl osed with this questionnaire are a number of maps, each one showi ng a property tract in the coastal
zone. Later in this questionnaire we are going to ask you to focus on just one of these tracts of l and, but
for the first few questions (1 through 5) we woul d like you to answer with res pect to all of the properties
you own or manage.

1.

How many total acres of land (wetlands and upl ands) do you own (by yourself,
jointly, or as a corporation) and into how many separate tracts is it divided?
________ acres

div ided among

________ tracts

Wetlands can be defined as areas havi ng wet soils supporti ng water -lovi ng pl ants
for at least part of the year and/ or areas covered by shallow water at some ti me
during the year.

2.

3.

Given this defin ition, what percent of the total acreage fro m ques tion 1 is wetl and?
________ percent (If zero, you do not have to finish the survey – please mail
back the questionnaire in the envelope provided).
Do you know that various government-sponsored wetland restoration and
maintenance programs exist?
o No
o Yes – If yes, how many acres do you currently have in each of the following
programs?
________ Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP)
________ Coastal Wetlands Reserve Program (CWRP)
________ Coastal Protection and Restoration Authority (CPRA)
________ Coastal Wetlands Planning, Preservation &
Restoration Act (CWPPRA)
________ Other (Please exp lain belo w)
_______________________________________________________

4.

Would you be willing to participate in future government-sponsored wetland
restoration and maintenance programs?
o No, not under any circu mstances (If no, p lease skip question 5).
o Yes, given the right incentives and conditions.

5.

Please indicate (by circling a nu mber) the level of importance each potential
incentive would have in convincing you to participate in future government sponsored wetland restoration and maintenance programs.
Not
Important

Very
Important
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General tax breaks

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Cost-sharing assistance

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Direct grants and subsidies

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Temporary conservation easements

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Permanent conservation easements

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Expanded opportunities to use
wetlands in mitigation banking
(development offset)

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Use of wetlands in carbon credit
programs

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Other incentives (please explain)

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

___________________________________________________________

The next section of the questionnaire (questions 6 through 24) seeks information about one of the property
tracts that you own. If you look at the property maps, you will notice that each is labeled with a letter at
the top. Please choose the property tract that you have invested the most in wi th respect to wetlands
restorati on/ mai ntenance and answer the followi ng questions with that s pecific property i n mind. If you
have not invested in any of the property tracts, please choose the l argest tract and ans wer the remaining
questions.
I am going to be ans wering the following questions wi th res pect to property
o Tract A
o Tract B

6.

7.

8.

Do you still maintain o wnership (solely, jointly, or other) in the tract?
o Yes – If yes, in what year did your ownership start?
_______
o No – If no, what year did you stop owning the property? _______
IF YOU NO LONGER HAVE OWNERS HIP,
PLEAS E S KIP TO QUES TION 25.
How do you own the specific property tract?
o Sole ownership
o Joint ownership through a tenants -in-common arrangement
o Joint ownership through a corporation or trust
o Other (p lease exp lain )
________________________________________________________
If you maintain jo int ownership of the property, what percent of the tract do
you own?
_________ percent
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9.

What percent of your total 2008 household income came fro m surface (non -oil
& gas) activities taking place on the tract?
_________ percent

10. What percent of your total 2008 household income came fro m sub -surface (oil
& gas) activities taking place on the tract?
_________ percent
11. How many wetland acres have been lost on this tract of land due to erosion,
storms, or other environ mental factors during the time you have owned it?
________ acres
12. How would you describe the overall condition of the wetlands within the tract?
o Poor
o Good
o Excellent
o I don‟t know

13. Please indicate (by circling a nu mber) the level of importance each of the
listed activities has in the way the property tract is currently used.
Not
Important

Very
Important

Agriculture production

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Timber production

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Fur trapping, alligator hunting,
and/or egg collection

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Waterfowl hunting

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

All types of fishing

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Oil & gas activities

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Other (p lease exp lain )

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

14. Is any part of this tract being leased out for activit ies in question 13?
o No
Yes – If yes, how many acres are leased out? _______ acres
15. Which of the follo wing best describes the current management of this property?
o Self-managed
o Managed using a hired service or employees
o Managed by a leaseholder
o Not being actively managed
o Managed by government personnel
16. If you were to sell the property tract today, what price do you think you might
receive?
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$ ____________
17. Have any wetland maintenance or restoration activities ever been attempted on
this tract of land?
o No, not to my knowledge (please skip to question 22)
o Yes – If yes, what year d id they start?
_______ year
Please estimate the total nu mber of wetland acres that have been
restored or maintained on this tract of land over the last 10 years _______acres

18. What practices were used to restore or maintain the wetlands on this tract of
land? (Please check all that apply)
o Water control structures (gates, weirs, etc.)
o Vegetative plantings (trees or grasses)
o Nutrient/sediment traps (brush fences, terraces, etc.)
o Sediment, dredge or spoil usage
o Increased fresh water inputs to the property
o Other (p lease exp lain below)
_______________________________________________________

19. If you were involved in the decision to undertake restoration and maintenance
activities on this tract of land, please indicate (by circling a number) the level of
importance each of the listed reason was to your decision.
Not
Important

Very
Important

Availability of restoration
subsidies in the form of
monetary payments

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Availability of restoration
subsidies in the form of
technical assistance

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Desire to protect or enhance the
property market value

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Desire to protect or enhance the
property‟s revenue generating
ability

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Recent imp rovements in
restoration technology

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Desire to protect or enhance the
ecological functions

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Other (p lease exp lain below)

1---------2---------3---------4---------5
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20. Over the last 10 years that you had ownership in the property, what level of
private investment expenditures were made on wetland restoration and
maintenance activities? Please do not include expenditures that were paid for
by non-private parties, such as government agencies or programs.
$ __________
21. Over the last 10 years that you had ownership in the property, what level of
public (i.e., govern mental agency or program) investment expenditures were
made on wetland restoration and maintenance activities (if you only know the
government‟s cost share, please provide that information)?
$ __________
or
_________ percent cost share
o Public investments were made, but I do not know how much.
22. If no restoration or maintenance activities have been attempted on the tract of
land, or if you would not consider future restoration activities, please indicate
(by circling a number) the level of importance each of the listed reason was to
this decision.
Not
Important

Very
Important

High current cost of
restoration

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Uncertainty about future costs
and benefits of restoration

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Insufficient government
financial incentives

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

No need for wetland restoration

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Lack of personal financial
resources for restorations

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

Lacks of personal economic
benefits from restorations

1---------2---------3---------4---------5

23. Uncertainty can sometimes be an important factor when making decisions. With
respect to your wetland investment decision, please rank the following sources of
uncertainty in terms of their importance to you, with 1 being the most important, 2
the next most important, etc.
____ Changing government policies
____ Availability of effect ive restoration technology
____ Changing restoration costs
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____ Shift ing environmental conditions
____ Others (please specify______________________________________)

24. If you consider uncertainty an important factor in your wetland investment decision,
please indicate your level of uncertainty in whether your investment will yield a
positive payoff by circling the appropriate number?
0---------1--------2-------3-------4--------5--------6-------7--------8--------9-------10
No uncertainty
High uncertainty

This next question seeks informati on that will hel p us better understand your
attitudes concerning coastal wetlands restoration.

25. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree with each of the statements by
circling the appropriate number using the given scale:
Strongly
Disagree
Restoration is important to
future generations

Strongly
Agree

1----------2----------3----------4----------5

Restored wetlands protect
wildlife and/or fish habitat

1----------2----------3----------4----------5

Restoring wetlands
improves water quality and
reduces erosion

1----------2----------3----------4----------5

Restored wetlands provide
storm and flood protection

1----------2----------3----------4----------5

Restoring wetlands is a
waste of time and money
given the predicted
increases in sea level

1----------2----------3----------4----------5

In this next section we ask questions that will allow us to categorize your res ponses with
other survey partici pants.

26. How o ld are you? _______
27. What is the highest level of education that you have attained?
o Some high school (or less)
o Co mpleted high school or GED
o Trade or technical school graduate
o Some college
o College graduate
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28. What is your gender?
o Male
o Female
29. Which of the follo wing best describes your total household pre-tax 2008 income?
o Under $15,000
o $15,001 to $30,000
o $30,001 to $50,000
o $50,001 to $70,000
o $70,001 to $100,000
o $100,001 to $150,000
o $150,001 to $200,000
o Over $200,000
30. Are you a legal resident of the State of Louisiana?
o Yes
o No
31. Do you live on the tract of land indicated on the map included in this survey
package?
o Yes
o No

This last section of the questionnaire is designed to hel p us measure your attitudes
towards risk and how those attitudes might affect your decision making regarding
wetlands conservation and restoration.

32. Co mpared to other landowners, how wou ld you rate your willingness to undertake
risky investments? (please circle the appropriate number
1--------2--------3--------4--------5--------6--------7--------8--------9--------10
Risk Hating
Risk Loving

33. Please indicate how much you disagree or agree with each of the fo llo wing
statements by circulating the appropriate number.
Strongly
Disagree

Strongly
Agree

I like taking financial risks

1--------2--------3--------4--------5

I try to avoid investment risks

1--------2--------3--------4--------5

I am willing to take financial risks in
order to realize higher returns

1--------2--------3--------4--------5

I prefer to receive a guaranteed return
even if it is low

1--------2--------3--------4--------5

It is unlikely that I would invest in a

1--------2--------3--------4--------5
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business if it has a chance of failing
When making investment decisions I
attach equal weight to maximizing
long-term returns and minimizing
financial risks.

1--------2--------3--------4--------5

I aim to achieve high long-term returns
on my investments even if that means
taking significant financial risks in the
short-run

1--------2--------3--------4--------5

I prefer to receive a guaranteed low
return on my investments rather than
an uncertain high return

1--------2--------3--------4--------5

Another way to measure your attitudes towards risk is to ask you to choose from a group of potential
investments where you know the possible outcomes of each choice.

34. Suppose that you are given $25,000 to invest, and you have seven investment options to choose fro m (see
graph below). Each investment option will yield one of 3 levels of net returns, with a 1 in 3 chance of each
level occurring. These investment options are designed such that the level of risk you face increases as you
move fro m left to right on the graph.
For examp le, by choosing investment #1 you are guaranteed to receive an annual net return of $2,500.
However, if you choose investment #7 you have a 1 in 3 chance of doubling your retu rn co mpared to #1, but
you also have a 1 in 3 chance of losing all the guaranteed return you would have received under investment
#1. Please examine the likely annual net returns fro m the 7 potential investment options and circle the
number of the option you would prefer to have.

131

35. Now assume that your investment level has been increased fro m $25,000 to $100,000. Please examine the
likely annual net returns fro m the 7 potential investment options and circle the number of the option you
would prefer to have.

36. Now assume your investment level has been increased fro m $25,000 to $250,000. Please examine the likely
annual net returns fro m the 7 potential investment options and circle the number of the option you would
prefer to have.

37. Please use the space below to provide us with other comments or suggestions you might have concerning
the incentives and programs that could be used to encourage private investment in coastal wet land
restoration and maintenance
Thank you for completing the survey.
Please mail the questionnaire back in the envelope provi ded.
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APPENDIX-B
RESULTS OF THE AUXILIARY REGRESSION MODEL

Table B1. Prediction of the total household income

Variable

Coefficient

Standard error

Intercept

1.168

0.788

Lnwetac

0.365***

0.118

Educ

0.570***

0.179

R-Square

0.41

***, denotes that the corresponding parameters are significant at 1%
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APPENDIX-C
RESULTS OF THE RESTRICTED TOBIT MODEL

Table C1. Parameter estimates of the restricted Tobit model

Variable

Robust
standard error

Coefficient

Constant

-582377**

237994.8

lnwetacr

36147.34

22993.89

Riskatt

23563.67

15714.18

Sowner

120062*

64970.49

Govwetrp

94710.88

143271.3

Pubinv

-8900.84

141251.1

-1.66

1.12

15403.04

23442.78

Landinc
Educ
Log-Likelihood
Likelihood ratio
statistics
Prob>chi-square

-229.5
16.47
0.02

Sample size

59
***,**,* denotes that the corresponding parameters are significant at 1%,5% and 10%
respectively
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